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In this study we develop and demonstrate a powerful and flexible forward-looking portfolio 
simulation methodology for assessing the correlated impacts of market risk, and private 
sector, sovereign and inter-bank default risk on both individual banks (i.e. 28 of the largest 
Brazilian banks) and groups of banks (i.e. the Brazilian banking system). The methodology 
importantly accounts for bank asset and liability maturity and currency mismatches and loan 
portfolio credit quality and sector and region concentrations. In a significant innovation, 
financial and economic environment variables are modeled with stochastic volatilities and 
correlations. We demonstrate the reliability of the models by comparing simulated and 
historical credit transition probabilities, simulated and historical bank rates of return, and 
simulated versus actual bank credit ratings. When omitting sovereign risk our analysis 
indicates that none of the banks face significant default risk over a 1-year horizon. This low 
default risk stems primarily from the large amount of government securities held by Brazilian 
banks, but also reflects the banks’ adequate capitalizations and extraordinarily high interest 
rate spreads. Once sovereign risk is considered and losses in the market value of government 
securities reaches 10 percent (or higher), several banks face potential solvency problems. 
These results demonstrate the well known risk of concentrated lending to a borrower which 
has a non-zero probability of default (e.g. Government of Brazil). We also demonstrate the 
potential systemic risk impact of variation in average recovery rates on defaulted private 
sector loans which reflect, among other factors, bank lending policies, the efficiency of the 
legal system in resolving defaults, and aggregate levels of defaults. Our analysis also 
highlights the importance of accounting for the differential risk characteristics of various 
banks and for the inter-bank risk channel, through which a systemic crisis may propagate. It 
further indicates that, in the event of a sovereign default, the Government of Brazil would face 
constrained debt management alternatives. To the best of our knowledge no one else has put 
forward a systematic methodology for assessing correlated market and credit (sovereign, 
corporate and inter-bank) default risk for a financial system. 
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In this study we seek to develop a forward-looking methodology for assessing the systemic banking 
risk (the likelihood of multiple banks failures), that integrates market and credit risk using a Portfolio 
Simulation Approach (PSA), with an application to the Brazilian banking system. We have performed 
a large number of simulations using comprehensive data for 28 of the largest Brazilian banks, which 
invest heavily in government loans. In the first part we simulate the banks individually, considering 
two scenarios: (i) Brazilian government never defaults on its domestic debt; and (ii) Brazilian 
government can default at a rate comparable to the average default rate of sovereign debts rated in the 
same grade as Brazil, according to Fitch. Our results show that, while some banks do lose money even 
if government default is not accounted, none of the banks face significant default risks, over the 1-
year simulation horizon. However, once the government default is factored in, then several simulated 
banks present default problems. These results combined show the perverse side of lending too much 
to the government. First, even if the government does not default, holding too much government debt 
preempts banks from earning higher (riskier) interest income from business and customers’ loans. 
Second, it is possible to reduce the amount lent to the government and balance the portfolio in such a 
way that banks’ will still produce profitable capital on average, even after accounting for government 
default. We also show that average and standard deviations of the return on average assets (ROAA) 
and the return on average equity (ROAE) are unbiased estimators for the same moments for historical 
ROAA and ROAE. While this result needs to be taken with caution, given the analysis limitations, it 
does show the simulation framework capability of reproducing banks’ profitability ratios that are 
reasonably comparable to historical values 
In the second part we use the results from these simulations and divide the banks in to three groups 
according to their default rates and to the average capital required to bail the banks out, so as to push 
their simulated capital ratios to a 0.08 capital level. Our categorization is generally consistent with 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s ratings, and departs slightly from Fitch ratings. Simulated groups 
also produce capital ratios, default rates, and bail-out cost that are on average very consistent with the 
credit risk categorization: average simulated capital ratios degrades as credit risk increase and default 
rates and bail-out cost increase as credit risk increases. 
Finally, we assess systemic risk of the Brazilian financial system, in different ways. We first consider 
a single bank that is a combination of all 28 banks, then we simulate the three groups simultaneously 
and include the risk component associated with interbank default (interbank propagation channel). 
Our results show that aggregating the banks in one single bank heavily underestimates the cost 
associated with a systemic risk crisis, when compared to the simultaneous simulation case, albeit the 
risk of all banks defaulting at the same time, through the interbank propagation channel is very small. Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung 
In dieser Studie wollen wir eine vorausschauende Methodik zur Einschätzung des systemischen 
Bankrisikos (der Wahrscheinlichkeit von multiplen Bankausfällen) entwickeln, die das Markt- und 
das Kreditrisiko anhand eines Portfoliosimulationsverfahrens integriert. Die Methodik soll sodann auf 
das brasilianische Bankensystem angewendet werden. Wir haben zahlreiche Simulationen 
durchgeführt, die sich auf umfassende Daten für 28 der größten brasilianischen Banken mit starkem 
Engagement im Bereich der staatlichen Kredite stützten. Im ersten Teil simulieren wir die Banken 
einzeln, wobei zwei Szenarien unterstellt werden: 1) die brasilianische Regierung ist immer in der 
Lage, ihre Inlandsschulden zu bedienen, und 2) die brasilianische Regierung kann zahlungsunfähig 
werden, wobei die Ausfallrate in etwa der durchschnittlichen Ausfallrate von Staatsschulden mit 
demselben Fitch-Rating wie Brasilien entspricht. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass einige Banken zwar 
tatsächlich Verluste verzeichnen, auch wenn eine Zahlungsunfähigkeit der Regierung nicht 
berücksichtigt wird, dass aber keine der Banken in dem einjährigen Simulationszeitraum einem 
nennenswerten Ausfallrisiko unterliegt. Wird allerdings der Ausfall der Regierung miteinbezogen, 
weisen mehrere simulierte Banken Probleme bezüglich des Ausfallrisikos auf. Zusammen betrachtet 
offenbaren diese Ergebnisse die negativen Seiten einer zu starken Kreditvergabe an den Staat. Erstens 
hindert ein zu hoher Bestand an Staatspapieren, selbst wenn die Regierung nicht zahlungsunfähig 
wird, die Banken daran, höhere (risikoreichere) Zinserträge aus Unternehmens- und Kundenkrediten 
zu erzielen. Zweitens ist es möglich, den der Regierung gewährten Kreditbetrag zu verringern und das 
Portfolio derart auszurichten, dass die Banken im Durchschnitt selbst dann noch gewinnbringendes 
Kapital erwirtschaften, wenn eine Zahlungsunfähigkeit der Regierung einbezogen wird. Wir weisen 
zudem nach, dass durchschnittliche und standardmäßige Abweichungen von der durchschnittlichen 
Gesamtkapitalrendite und der durchschnittlichen Eigenkapitalrendite für dieselben Momente 
unverzerrte Schätzwerte für die entsprechende historische Gesamtkapital- und Eigenkapitalrendite 
darstellen. Diese Erkenntnis ist aufgrund der Einschränkungen der Analyse zwar mit Vorsicht zu 
betrachten, doch zeigt sie, dass das Simulationsverfahren imstande ist, Ertragskennziffern der Banken 
nachzubilden, die hinlänglich mit den historischen Werten vergleichbar sind. 
Im zweiten Teil verwenden wir die Ergebnisse dieser Simulationen und ordnen die Banken in drei 
Gruppen ein; dies geschieht nach Maßgabe der jeweiligen Ausfallrate und des durchschnittlichen 
Kapitals, das zur Rettung der Banken erforderlich ist, um ihre simulierte Eigenkapitalquote auf einen 
Wert von 0,08 anzuheben. Unsere Einteilungen stimmen im Wesentlichen mit den Ratings von 
Moody’s sowie Standard and Poor’s überein, weichen aber geringfügig von den Fitch-Ratings ab. Für 
die simulierten Gruppen werden ebenfalls Eigenkapitalquoten, Ausfallquoten und Rettungskosten 
ermittelt, die im Durchschnitt deutlich der Klassifizierung der Kreditrisiken entsprechen: Wenn das Kreditrisiko steigt, gehen die durchschnittlichen simulierten Eigenkapitalquoten zurück und die 
Ausfallraten sowie die Rettungskosten nehmen zu.  
Abschließend bewerten wir die systemischen Risiken des brasilianischen Finanzsystems auf 
verschiedene Weise. Zunächst untersuchen wir eine einzelne Bank, die einer Kombination aus allen 
28 Banken entspricht, und danach simulieren wir die drei Gruppen gleichzeitig unter 
Berücksichtigung der mit Interbank-Ausfällen zusammenhängenden Risikokomponente (Interbank-
Ausbreitungskanal). Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass – verglichen mit der gleichzeitigen Simulation – 
bei der Zusammenfassung aller Banken in einer einzelnen Bank die Kosten, die sich aus einer Krise 
infolge eines systemischen Risikos ergeben, stark unterzeichnet werden; allerdings ist das Risiko 
eines gleichzeitigen Ausfalls aller Banken durch den Interbank-Ausbreitungskanal sehr gering. 1. Introduction 
At any future time, individuals, businesses, banks, groups of banks, and the Government of 
Brazil (GOB) will all face the same financial and economic environment (for better or worse). There 
is every reason to expect that the credit quality (default probability) for each of the above entities is 
non-zero, stochastic, and correlated with future financial and economic environment conditions (e.g. 
default rates will go up during periods of economic stress). There is also reason to believe that bank 
market risk is driven systematically by the same future financial and economic conditions. These 
correlated market and credit risks have significant impacts on individual bank risk and banking 
system risk and need to be accounted for systematically, to produce more useful integrated risk 
assessments.
1
The 80’s and 90’s have witnessed a number of systemic banking crises
2, sometimes with 
transnational contagion effects. The importance of developing tools for assessing ex-ante the 
probability of a systemic failure of the banking sector and their large associated monetary cost is 
obvious. For emerging economies the government may have difficulty in accessing adequate funds to 
resolve this type of crisis
3. In addition, as noted by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), banking 
crises might also spread to other sectors of the economy, as the availability of credit may be disrupted, 
“[r]educing investment and consumption, and possibly forcing viable firms into bankruptcy.” It can 
be equally harmful to “[t]he functioning of the payment system, as banks failure undermines 
confidence in financial institutions, reducing domestic savings and producing a large-scale capital 
outflow. Finally, a systemic crisis may force otherwise-sound banks to close their doors.”
Forward-looking risk assessment methodologies can be of central importance in quantifying 
the potential magnitude of the risk and, more importantly, in allowing for the identification and 
evaluation of proactive steps that may be undertaken to manage such risks. The current practice is to 
undertake market and credit risk assessments separately (e.g. Basel Accord (1988, 1996, and 2001)). 
Combining such separate risk measures into one overall portfolio risk measure is not easily 
accomplished (see, for example, Jarrow and Turnbull (2000) and Barnhill and Maxwell (2002)). The 
absence of reliable overall portfolio risk measures creates problems for determining capital adequacy 
requirements, capital-at-risk measures, hedging strategies, etc.  
1 The ValueCalc Global Portfolio and Credit Risk software, copyright FinSoft, Inc. 1996-2005, was used to 
undertake the risk analyses reported in this study. 
2 See Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) and Caprio and Klingebiel (1996). 
3 This, of course, suggests the need to also model the impact of systemic banking default on sovereign balance 
sheet. We look forward to addressing this future research topic. 
1Barnhill and Maxwell (2002) developed a diffusion-based methodology for assessing the 
value-at-risk (VaR) of a portfolio of fixed income securities with correlated interest rate, interest rate 
spread, exchange rate, equity market and credit risk – the Portfolio Simulation Approach (PSA). This 
approach was later extended by Barnhill, Papapanagiotou, and Schumacher (2003) to undertake 
financial institution asset and liability risk assessments for South African banks and by Barnhill, 
Papapanagiotou, and Souto (2004) to estimate potential losses associated with banking default in the 
Japanese financial system. Barnhill, Souto, and Tabak (2003) utilize the PSA approach to simulate 
credit transition matrix for Brazilian bank loans
4. These studies have demonstrated that the PSA 
methodology produces: 
1. simulated financial environments that match closely the assumed parameters for the 
environmental variables, 
2. simulated credit transition probabilities similar to reported historical transition 
probabilities,
3. simulated prices of bonds with credit risk close to observed market prices, and 
4. simulated value at risk measures for bond portfolios very similar to historical value at risk 
measures reflecting correlated market and credit risk. 
To the best of our knowledge no one else has put forward a systematic methodology for 
assessing  correlated market and credit (sovereign, corporate, and inter-bank) default risk for a 
financial system. 
In this study we construct a portfolio simulation model that undertakes such an integrated risk 
assessment, in the same spirit of Barnhill and Maxwell (2002), and apply the model to the Brazilian 
financial system
5. In order to be able to do that, we first need to understand the potential venues 
through which a systemic banking failure can propagate. The literature has identified several 
channels. First, banks are directly interdependent through a nexus of financial inter-bank contracts. 
One insolvent bank might become unable to honor their contracts, provoking financial distress to its 
counterparts (e.g. Rochet and Tirole (1986) and Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2003)). Second, banks’ 
assets have some degree of correlation as banks might invest in the same industries or geographical 
regions. If a shock affects one or more particular industry (or geographical region), then banks with 
exposure to that industry (or geographical region) will be systematically affected (e.g. Acharya (2001) 
and Lehar (2003)). Third, the news of one bank failure can provoke depositors from other banks to 
4 Section 2 provides additional technical details regarding the simulation model formulation as well as a 
comparison of the simulated and historical credit transition probability matrices (and default rates) for Brazilian 
business loans. 
5 Brazilian financial system is a very interesting case to be studied because of some interesting features shared 
by many Brazilian banks: (i) huge exposure to government default; (ii) high interest rate spreads; and (iii) 
substantial inefficiencies. 
2withdraw their funds (bank run), depleting banks’ capital (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)) and Gorton 
(1985)). Fourth, a downward business cycle may cause companies’ distress, rendering many loans 
delinquent and causing banks to further reduce business lending. This can deepen the business cycle, 
worsening the financial crises and affecting more banks (e.g. Gorton (1988)). Fifth, correlated interest 
rate, exchange rate and equity price risk (i.e. may also impact multiple banks simultaneously. Sixth, 
various factors including bank lending policies, the efficiency of the legal system in resolving loan 
defaults, and the aggregate level of defaults can impact substantially on bank risk through variations 
in the recovery rates on defaulted loans.  Finally, sovereign defaults may simultaneously impose 
direct losses on banks through a reduction in the market value of their Government securities and 
indirect loses brought about by economic and contract disruptions that incrementally increase the 
default rates on private sector loans. 
We model the financial and economic environment under which banks are assumed to operate 
as a set of correlated stochastic processes describing various macroeconomic/financial state variables. 
A combination of correlated ‘bad draws’ for these macroeconomic/financial state variables will 
eventually impact the banks with negative effects comparable to those provoked by a large 
macroeconomic shock. Indeed, we have modeled volatilities and correlations as stochastic variables in 
our simulation, in an attempt to increase the mass towards the distributions’ tails (see Barnhill and 
Souto (2007)). This approach not only allows us to capture the influences of macroeconomic forces
6
on banks performance, but also potentially the influences from variations in interest rates, exchange 
rates, and other factors. We deem this step to be very important. Several authors have stressed the 
importance of macroeconomic factors such as cyclical GDP downturns, interest rate increases, or 
exchange rate devaluations on banks performance (e.g. Gorton (1988) and Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal 
(1996), among others). In order to properly characterize the dynamic nature of the correlated 
stochastic processes, we model volatilities and correlations as stochastic variables by updating them in 
each Monte Carlo step. Barnhill and Souto (2007) provide a comprehensive examination of stochastic 
process for volatilities and correlations and its properties and performance, when incorporated within 
a Monte Carlo simulation. In that study they were able to simulate distributions of changes in 
volatilities that are reasonably close to historical distributions, by adjusting the corresponding decay 
factor appropriately. We will use their study as a basis for setting up the decay factors for the current 
bank simulation. 
Banks’ asset and liability portfolios (loans, equity and real estate investments, government 
securities, etc.) are modeled with considerable detail. For example, we use the credit quality 
distribution of private sector loans, as well as the distribution of such loans by different industries and 
geographical regions as model inputs. This feature of our simulation allows us to capture correlations 
6 It is possible to include proxies such as unemployment rates, GDP, etc. 
3in default rates in a bank’s private sector loan portfolio (one of the main channels of systemic crises, 
according to Acharya (2001)) at different levels: (i) if banks lend to similar industries or to similar 
geographical regions; (ii) if banks have similar loan portfolio credit qualities; and (iii) if banks have 
similar portfolio composition with respect to asset and liability maturities and currencies. Information 
on the structure of the banks’ portfolios is also needed to model correlated sovereign default risk, and 
inter-bank default risk.   
The reliability of the model is demonstrated in various ways. First, Barnhill, Souto, and Tabak 
(2003), and Barnhill and Souto (2007) have shown that the model can produce simulated credit rating 
transition probabilities and default rates for business loans that are very similar to those reported by 
Brazilian Banks. Second, by simulating a set of 11 private domestic Brazilian banks we show that the 
models produce means and standard deviations of return on average equity and assets
7 (ROAE and 
ROAA respectively) that are unbiased predictors of banks’ historical means and standard deviations 
of ROAE and ROAA. Finally we show that our risk assessments for individual banks are generally 
consistent with the ratings provided by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. 
We then proceed to simulate the banks at different levels: (i) individual, (ii) groups, and (iii) 
simultaneously. For our individual bank risk assessments we simulate 28 of the largest Brazilian 
banks for two different cases: (i) GOB is assumed to never default; and (ii) GOB can default on its 
debt with a 4.5 percent probability which is consistent with the average default probability of 
countries rated by Fitch in the same grade as Brazil (B rating), as of December 2004. 
 The issue of government default is central for assessing banking risk in Brazil, as Brazilian 
banks hold a significant amount of government securities, sometimes above 80 percent of their total 
assets. In this study we model government default in a relatively simplistic way, as a very large 
‘corporate borrower’ whose known default probability is systematically related to returns on the 
Brazilian equity market index plus an idiosyncratic component. The impact of inter-bank exposure is 
modeled, in a second step after the Monte Carlo simulations are done, and the initial bank risk 
assessments completed
8. For this purpose, we first aggregate the 28 banks into three groups according 
to their individual risk characteristics and then simulate them simultaneously
9. It is important to keep 
in mind the significance of modeling all of the correlated risks above. In particular during times of 
economic stress it is likely that default losses on private sector loans will increase, market volatility 
7 These returns on assets and equity reflect changes in the values of assets and liabilities, interest income and 
expenses, other net operating expenses, and taxes over the simulation period. 
8 Each simulation run produces a random path over a certain time-period (e.g. one year). To minimize 
computational effort and time, balance sheet accounts are recalculated only at the end of the time-period. 
9 The current version of the ValueCalc programs only allows for simulating three banks simultaneously (for 
computer memory reasons), although it has the potential to simulate any number of banks simultaneously. 
4and risk will also likely increase, and so will the risk of sovereign default. Thus, should a sovereign 
default occur, it will likely be at a time when many banks are already being adversely impacted by 
other risk factors. This is just the time when the failure of several banks could, through inter-bank 
credit defaults, precipitate a number of additional bank defaults and a systemic banking crisis. 
 The impacts of a Government default on the banking system are varied, hard to predict in 
advance, and will be very dependent on the contemporaneous policies adopted by the Government at 
the time of any such default. For the present application we will use a matrix of potential additional 
losses on banks’ portfolios, through two different channels. First, even if banks face no losses on 
government securities, they may face additional losses on their business and consumer loans, as these 
sectors of the economy are impacted by major disruptions in the economy due to the sovereign default 
event. Second we assess the direct impacts of various potential declines in the market value of the 
banks’ government debt portfolio.   
Our analysis finds that most Brazilian banks have reasonably high simulated capital ratios so 
long as the government does not default. However in the event of a sovereign default a number of 
Brazilian banks face potential solvency problems and could, if customers lose confidence, face 
liquidity problems as well. These results illustrate the well known risk of concentrated lending to an 
entity with a non-zero default rate. It also reveals another nocive facet of banks holding exceedingly 
large concentrations of government securities with a non-zero default probability. In the event of a 
sovereign default, the government has constrained debt management alternatives. Should the 
government take actions that significantly reduce the market value of government securities, then it 
could trigger a systemic banking system failure. In the particular case of GOB, in the event of 
government default, we show that losses of 10 percent or higher in the market value of government 
securities would create problems for a number of individual banks. Loss rates of 25 percent or higher 
on government securities could provoke a systemic banking crisis. Since the amount of GOB 
securities in Brazilian bank balance sheets is substantially larger than the amount of business and 
consumer (private sector) loans, the impact of incremental defaults on private sector loans has a 
smaller impact on banks’ risk of failure. A less obvious impact is that holding a very large amount of 
government debt preempts banks from earning higher interest income from business and consumer 
loans. It may be entirely possible to reduce the amount lent to the government and balance the 
portfolio in such a way that the banks expected profitability and risk profiles both improve, after 
accounting for sovereign risk. This suggests that the development of global markets for sovereign debt 
denominated in local currency could have the dual benefits of allowing sovereigns to diversify their 
borrowing sources and banks to diversify their loan portfolios and default risk. 
Our simulations also provide a way of grouping the banks, based on their credit worthiness, 
under an integrated risk framework.  In this analysis we assume that a sovereign default imposes a 10 
percent average loss on government securities and an incremental default rate on business and 
5consumer loans equal to the average default rate for each credit category. Specifically, we categorize 
Brazilian banks into three groups, based on their capital ratio at the 99% VaR level (meaning that the 
bank has 1 percent probability of having its capital ratio falling below this number). We find that our 
categorization is generally consistent with Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s ratings. Simulated 
capital ratios, default rates, and potential bail-out costs are on average very consistent with the credit 
risk categorization: the 99% VaR simulated capital ratios degrades as credit risk increase and default 
rates and bail-out cost increase as credit risk increases. 
Finally, we assess the systemic risk of the Brazilian financial system, in different ways. We 
first consider a single bank that is a combination of all 28 banks.  Subsequently we simulate three 
aggregate banks (based on the above risk categories) simultaneously and include the risk component 
associated with inter-bank default (inter-bank propagation channel). Our results show that aggregating 
the banks into one single bank underestimates the cost associated with a systemic risk crisis, when 
compared to the three-bank simultaneous simulation case. Our analysis highlights the danger of 
modeling the financial system as one single financial institution and not accounting for the differential 
risk characteristics of various banks and for the inter-bank risk channel, through which a systemic 
crisis may propagate. 
It is important to emphasize that our results should be taken as illustrative rather than 
definitive measures for Brazilian banks risk. This is so for several reasons. First, from a data 
standpoint, we have not had access to the most detailed (and specific) information on banks portfolios 
and on interest rate spreads charged by Brazilian banks. This information is protected by a 
confidentiality law in Brazil and could not be provided to us. Second, there are some methodological 
shortcomings on our analysis that can be improved further in future work. One of them would be 
modeling the GOB’s asset and liability structure and default risk in a more detailed manner (e.g. see 
Barnhill and Kopits (2004), or Barnhill (2006)). Such an approach would potentially yield more 
accurate sovereign default estimates results. It would also be interesting to improve further the 
methodology for modeling consumer loans in contrast to our approach of considering these loans to 
behave similarly to corporate loans. Finally, considering the significant operational expense ratio 
incurred by Brazilian banks, it would be quite interesting to build operational expenses variations in to 
the simulation model (as opposed to the current method of modeling operating expense as a constant 
percentage of assets). A simplistic way of capturing this risk facet could be through fitting a stochastic 
process in to the operational expense ratio time series and simulating it within the PSA framework as 
a correlated stochastic variable. In spite of all the identified data and other limitations we believe the 
model has demonstrated substantial potential for measuring and managing the risk level of banks and 
banking systems. Clearly there are opportunities to improve and extend both the methodologies and 
the data used in the analysis. 
6The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the portfolio simulation 
model we use to undertake the various integrated risk assessments.  In Section 3 we present and 
discuss the risk assessments for Brazilian banks and the Brazilian banking system. Concluding 
remarks and final comments are given in Section 4.  
2.  An Integrated Model of Correlated Market, Credit, Sovereign, and Inter-Bank 
Risk in an Environment with Stochastic Volatilities and Correlations 
An integrated analysis of correlated market risk, and private sector, sovereign, and inter-bank 
default risk on both individual banks (i.e. 28 of the largest Brazilian banks) and groups of banks (i.e. 
the Brazilian banking system) requires a powerful and flexible forward-looking risk assessment 
methodology.  Portfolio simulation is the methodology we have identified as being capable of 
undertaking such an analysis. 
Our models are based on the observation that at any future time all entities existing in a 
particular economic environment will experience the same financial and economic conditions.  We 
propose that it is possible to identify a set of correlated financial and economic variables, for example 
sector equity returns and regional unemployment rates
10, which systematically impact the credit 
quality and produce correlated default rates among various groups of borrowers (e.g. businesses in 
various sectors, and individuals in various regions).  We also model many uncorrelated borrower 
specific risk factors. We find such detailed individual borrower and portfolio modeling necessary to 
assess the risk level of portfolios of loans with varying credit quality distributed across various sectors 
and regions.  In particular it allows for explicit modeling of loan portfolio concentration and 
diversification impacts on bank risk levels.   
We further propose that the identified set of correlated financial and economic variables can 
include ones which have systematic impacts on the market values of securities, loans, and other assets.  
Examples of such variables are interest rates, interest rate spreads, FX rates, equity index returns, and 
commodity prices.  Also in a significant innovation financial and economic environment variables are 
modeled with stochastic volatilities and correlations. 
  The structure of the systemic bank risk simulation model is as follows: 
– Simulate the future financial environment (e.g. 1 year) as a set of correlated stochastic 
variables that systematically impact each bank’s market risk (interest rates, interest rate 
10 In circumstances where banks hold significant mortgage loans it is useful to model regional real estate prices 
as a systematic credit risk driver (see Barnhill, Papapanagiotou, and Schumacher, 2003 and Barnhill, 
Papapanagiotou, and Souto, 2004).  Most Brazilian banks hold very few mortgage loans thus we did not model 
Brazilian real estate prices. 
7spreads, FX rates) and credit risk (sector equity returns, regional real estate prices, 
regional unemployment rates, etc.). 
– Simulate the correlated evolution of the credit rating (default) for each borrower in each 
bank’s loan portfolio as a function of the simulated financial environment. 
– Simulate the correlated evolution of the credit rating (default) for the Government of 
Brazil as a function of the simulated financial environment. 
– Revalue each asset and liability in each bank’s balance sheet as a function of the 
simulated financial environment and credit ratings.  Note that for each run of the 
simulation the simulated value of each bank’s assets and liabilities reflect correlated 
market and credit risk. 
– Estimate each bank’s pre-tax income, operating costs, taxes, and after-tax income over 
the simulation period. 
– Calculate financial performance measures for each bank (e.g. economic capital ratio, rate 
of return on assets, etc.) under the simulated conditions.  Estimate if the bank will fail or 
not.
– Estimate each bank’s potential losses on defaulted inter-bank loans. 
– Recalculate financial performance measures for each bank (e.g. economic capital ratio, 
rate of return on assets, etc.) under the simulated conditions.  Re-estimate if each bank 
will fail or not. 
– Repeat the simulation a large number of times. 
– Analyze the distributions of simulated bank financial performance measures (e.g. 
economic capital ratio) to determine individual bank and banking system systemic risk 
levels
11.
2.1.  Modeling the Financial Environment  
2.1.1.  Simulating Stochastic Term Structures 
For this study, the Hull and White extended Vasicek model (Hull and White; 1990a, 1993, 
1994) is used to model stochastic risk-free (e.g. U.S. Treasury) interest rates. In this model interest 
rates are assumed to follow a mean-reversion process with a time dependent reversion level. The 
simulation model is robust to the use of other interest rate models.  
11 In the present study the bank portfolio is assumed to be constant over the risk horizon of the exercise 
(e.g., one-year) and is repriced in each run of the simulation using the simulated prices and credit quality of the 
borrowers. Simulations were run for 2000 times using monthly (i.e. 12) time steps. 
8The model for r is:
'r = a (
T() t
a
 - r)'t+ V'z,         ( 1 )  
where 'r is the risk-neutral process by which r changes, a is the rate at which r reverts to its long term 
mean, r is the instantaneous continuously compounded short-term interest rate, T(t) is “Theta”, an 
unknown function of time which is chosen so that the model is consistent with the initial term 
structure and is calculated from the initial term structure as: 
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F (0,t) is the forward interest rate at time t as calculated at time 0, Ft (0,t) is the derivative of 
the forward interest rate with respect to time, 't is a small increment to time, V is “sigma”, the 
instantaneous standard deviation of r, which is assumed to be constant, and 'z is a Wiener process 
driving term structure movements with 'r being related to 'tby the function 'z = H 't .
The above mean reversion and volatility rates can be estimated from a time series of short-
term interest rates or implied from cap and floor prices. In this study they are estimated from a time 
series of short-term interest rates over the 1995-2004 period. Given a simulated future value of r, the 
initial term structure, and the other parameters of the model a complete term structure of risk-free 
interest rates can be calculated and financial assets can be re-valued at time step 't.
Once the risk-free term structure has been estimated then the AA term structure is modeled as 
a stochastic lognormal spread over risk-free, the A term structure is modeled as a stochastic spread 
over AA, etc. The mean value of these simulated credit spreads are set approximately equal to the 
forward rates implied by the initial term structures for various credit qualities (e.g. AA). This 
procedure insures that all simulated credit spreads
12 are always positive and that the simulated risky 
term structures are approximately arbitrage free. 
2.1.2. Simulating  Asset  Returns 
The model utilized to simulate the value of the equity market indices and FX rate (S) assumes 
that (S) follows a geometric Brownian motion where the expected growth rate (m) and volatility (V)
are constant (Hull, 1997, p. 362). The expected growth rate is equal to the expected return on the asset 
(P) minus its dividend yield (q). For a discrete time step, 't, it can be shown that 
12 Different credit spreads for borrowers with different ratings estimated for each bank so as to account for the 
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where H is a random sample from a standardized normal distribution.  
The return on the market index (Km) is estimated as: 
Km = ('S/S)  +  q.          (4) 
2.1.3.  Simulating an n-variate Normal Distribution 
In the current portfolio risk assessment model, the equity indices and FX rate returns are 
simulated as stochastic variables correlated with the simulated future risk-free interest rate and interest 
rate spreads. Hull (1997) describes a procedure for working with an n-variate normal distribution (the 
Cholesky decomposition). This procedure requires the specification of correlations between each of 
the n stochastic variables. Subsequently n independent random samples H are drawn from standardized 
normal distributions. With this information the set of correlated random error terms for the n
stochastic variables can be calculated. For example, for a bivariate normal distribution, 
H   x              (5)
H2= Ux1 + x2
2 1 U            ( 6 )  
where x1, x2 are independent random samples from standardized normal distributions, U is the 
correlation between the two stochastic variables, and H1, H2 are the required samples from a 
standardized bivariate normal distribution. 
2.1.4.   Stochastic Volatilities and Correlations 
  Variances and covariances are updated for each simulation time step via the following model: 
,, 1 , (1 ) ij t ij t ij t t 1 VO V O V Q      ,        (7)
where ~( 0 , 1 ) t N Q . Initial variances and covariances at the start of each simulation run are estimated 
as the average realized variances and covariances over the entire Jul/94 to Dec/03 period. Similar to 
modeling stochastic returns, volatility shocks are also modeled via Cholesky decomposition and are 
thus affected by the correlation structure of the state variables. 
  Barnhill and Souto (2007) show that by changing the decay factor (Ȝ) appropriately this 
approach increases the probability mass of index returns in the tails of simulated distributions and 
matches reasonably well the historical evolution of volatilities. This model is implemented to simulate 
the credit transition matrix for Brazilian bank loans and it is shown that this methodology has the 
potential to improve simulated transition probabilities as compared to the constant volatility case. In 
particular, it increases the simulated probability of default in lower credit risk categories to values 
closer to observed historical levels. 
102.2.  Modeling Banks’ Assets, Liabilities and Income  
2.2.1.   Banks’ Balance Sheets 
  Banks’ balance sheets are modeled with some degree of detail. On the liabilities side, we have 
(i) domestic funding, which includes inter-bank, demand, savings, and fixed deposits, NCD's, repos, 
and others; (ii) foreign funding (in foreign currency); (iii) debt; (iv) non-interest bearing liabilities; (v) 
capital and reserves; and (vi) equity. Domestic and foreign funding and debt can be broken down, in 
the simulation framework, in up to three different maturities
13 and then properly linked to different 
correlated stochastic interest rates (domestic or foreign) and foreign exchange rates. As we shall see, 
some asset accounts can also be modeled through multiple maturities and this structure allows us to 
incorporate asset and liability maturity and currency mismatches (i.e. market risk) as a component of 
banks’ integrated risk assessments. 
  On the asset side, the main accounts are (i) money (cash and gold reserves); (ii) Government 
of Brazil securities
14; (iii) business loans; (iv) consumer loans; (v) foreign loans; (vi) equity 
investments; (vii) real estate investments; and (viii) non-interest earning assets. Money and non-
interest earning assets are not updated in the course of the simulations (we thus assume that the bank 
does not change the amount of money and non-interest earning assets it holds, over the course of the 
simulation). Because they are usually the main risk elements in any bank’s portfolio, loans are 
modeled in more details and will be discussed in the next section. Like some of the liabilities 
accounts, it is also possible to model multiple loans maturities. As mentioned above, however, we are 
not modeling mortgage loans for Brazilian banks, but it is possible to be done. For examples of this 
application, see Barnhill, Papapanagiotou, and Schumacher (2003) who model residential mortgage 
loans for South African banks, and Barnhill, Papapanagiotou, and Souto (2004) who model both 
residential and commercial mortgage loans for Japanese banks. Equity and real estate investments are 
separately modeled through multiple one-factor models, with systematic and unsystematic risk 
components. 
  Unlike state variable returns that are estimated for each time-step in each simulation path, all 
balance sheet accounts are recalculated only at the end of each simulation period
15. In Table 3 we 
                                                
13 Based on the data we obtained, we categorized the liabilities into the following three maturity groups: < 1-
year, between 1 and 3 years, and > 3 years. The simulation methodology, however, is flexible enough to handle 
multiple maturities for both liabilities and assets as well as multiple currency denominations. 
14 We initially assume the government securities have no risk of default risk. There is a simple way of 
simulating the risk that the government might default on its debt, which will be discussed in more details below. 
15 We also specify the time-horizon and the time steps over which price paths and balance sheet accounts will be 
simulated, and the number of simulation runs. 
11present some descriptive statistics on the stylized balance sheet for 28 Brazilian banks.  This data was 
obtained from BankScope and the web site of the Brazilian central bank
16.
2.2.2.   Banks’ Loan Portfolio Composition 
  Absent other information, loans (which usually comprise the biggest fraction of most banks 
portfolios) are typically modeled as bonds. We allocate business and consumer loans separately across 
eight credit risk categories defined by Banco Central do Brasil (AA ,…, H). In the case of business 
loans, we also distribute them across 10 business sectors, while loans to individuals are distributed 
across 6 regions. This break down is important for capturing the portfolio diversification or 
concentration aspects of the risk analysis as well as the integrating of market and credit risk. In total 
we use approximately 450 stylized securities to model each bank. While a larger number of currencies 
and securities could have easily been modeled, we believe that this number is adequate to capture 
statistically much of the impact of bank asset and liability portfolio maturity, currency, credit quality 
and sector and region concentration characteristics. 
2.2.3.   Banks’ Operating Expenses, Taxes, and Income 
In addition to the bank’s assets and liabilities we also model net non-interest income. Net 
non-interest income is defined as fee income plus other non-interest income minus operating 
expenses. This sum is typically divided by total assets. We use historical information on this ratio to 
estimate, as of the end of simulation period, how much the bank will have spent on operations. This 
amount is then deducted from the bank’s simulated net interest income plus (minus) capital gains 
(losses) to estimate pre-tax income. We also estimate taxes paid by banks as an assumed percentage of 
taxable income over the simulation period.  After-tax income is estimated as pre-tax income less 
estimated taxes. 
2.3.  Modeling Bank Loan Portfolio Credit Risk 
The methodology used to model business loan credit transition probabilities and defaults 
starts with an extensive empirical analysis of all publicly traded companies in Brazil and all bank 
loans made to those firms by all Brazilian banks.  The purpose of this analysis is to identify typical 
debt to value ratios, beta coefficients, and firm specific equity return volatilities for Brazilian firms 
with various bank assigned credit ratings. We use this information to develop stylized firms for each 
                                                
16 It is possible to model a great variety of other financial instruments (e.g. bonds, zero coupon bonds, variable 
rate loans, forward contracts, swaps, options, etc.) within our simulation framework.  
12credit rating (i.e. target debt to value ratio, and assumed beta and firm specific risk factors).  For each 
run of the simulation the return on each borrowing firm’s equity is estimated as a function of the 
simulated return on an equity market index plus a firm specific random change. This simulated equity 
return allows the estimation of a new debt to value ratio and credit rating (including default) for each 
firm in the bank’s loan portfolio
17.
2.3.1.   Modeling Bank Borrowers’ Return on Equity 
The return on equity for individual firms is simulated using a one-factor model.  
Ki = RF + Betai(Km-RF)+ Vi'z,          ( 8 )  
where Ki is the return on equity for the firmi, RF is the risk-free interest rate, Betai is the systematic 
risk of firmi, Km is the simulated return on the equity index from equation 6, VI is the firm specific 
volatility in return on equity, and 'z is a Wiener process with 'z being related to 'tby the function 'z
= H 't .
After simulating the market return, the return on equity for an individual firm is estimated in 
the CAPM framework (equation 8). The first step in calculating the expected return on equity for a 
“typical” firm in a particular rating class (e.g. B) is to estimate appropriate beta coefficients and the 
unsystematic component of equity return risk.  
2.3.2.  Estimating Betas for a set of Brazilian Companies 
In order to implement the single-factor CAPM model
18 it is necessary to estimate betas and 
firm specific volatilities for Brazilian companies. Estimating betas for Brazilian companies was not an 
easy task, since many of them trade infrequently. As several stocks lack liquidity, price series tend to 
have artificial rigidities that might lower the estimated betas, misleading empirical evidence.  
Using 12 equity sector indices for Brazil (banks, basic industry, beverage, chemicals, general 
industry, metal, mining, oil, paper, telecommunication wireless, textile, tobacco, utility), betas for 543 
                                                
17 We were unable to obtain the data required to develop a separate credit risk model for consumer loans.  Thus 
in this study we also model consumer loans as business loans.  For this purpose we model a systematic risk 
factor for each region which has the return and volatility characteristics of the Ibovespa stock index but which 
has correlations with other financial and economic environment variables equal to those of the regional 
unemployment rates.  This model allows us to generate credit transition probabilities and default rate similar 
those reported by Brazilian banks and also account for some of the diversification benefits of lending to 
different types of borrowers (i.e. businesses in various sectors, and consumers in various regions). 
18 We opted for the CAPM single-factor model to evaluate the systematic and unsystematic portions of risk, 
because of its simplicity to implement and its appealing intuition of the risk/return relationship. However, multi-
factor models could be used as well. 
13companies were estimated accordingly to their respective industry sector
19. Data on prices for sector 
indices and individual stocks were collected from DataStream. We assume that the debt to value 
ratios, betas, and firm specific risk volatilities for these 543 firms will be representative of those for 
other bank borrowers with similar bank assigned credit ratings. 
Initial estimations using daily data resulted in many betas close to zero. To circumvent this 
problem, several attempts were made to estimate the betas: (i) using monthly observations, (ii) 














where EU is the unleveraged beta, EL is the leveraged beta, ĲC is the tax rate, D represents the current 
market value of outstanding debt and S is the market value of equity. 
Monthly observations produced the most consistent estimations for betas. Final results for 
estimated betas and firm-specific risk for firms in various credit rating categories as assigned by 
Brazilian banks
20, are given in Table 1.  As would be expected both the betas and firm specific risk 
levels increase as company bank loan ratings decline. 
2.3.3.  Mapping Debt Ratios into Credit Ratings 
The above simulated equity returns are then used to estimate a distribution of possible future 
equity market values and debt ratios
21. The simulated debt ratios are then mapped into credit ratings. 
This methodology assumes a deterministic relation between the firm’s debt ratio and its credit 
rating
22. In a contingent claims framework this is equivalent to assuming a constant volatility for the 
value of the firm. 
                                                
19 Estimating betas using sector indices instead of a broad market index allows us to capture the diversification 
benefit, as banks lend to companies in different sectors of the economy. 
20 More details on the simulated banks and on the transition probability matrix employed in this paper can be 
found in Barnhill, Souto, and Tabak (2003). 
21The debt-to-value ratio is defined as book value of debt divided by book value of debt plus market value of 
equity. We then assume that the firm has an expected growth rate and target debt-to-value ratio.  Fluctuations in 
realized company returns around trend returns result in fluctuations in simulated future debt-to-value ratios.  
While a case can be made for using the market value of debt to define debt-to-value ratios we did not have this 
information for Brazilian companies. 
22 Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998) suggest that leverage ratios and credit ratings are not constant over time. 
However, their results are over a longer time frame than simulated in this framework. 
14To implement this method an empirical analysis of the distribution of debt ratio
23 by rating 
class is performed on all publicly traded non-financial firms that borrow from all Brazilian banks
24.
Debt ratio distributions are then analyzed by rating category. The results are also found in Table 1. As 
expected, debt ratio increases as company bank loan ratings decline. For simulation runs reported later 
in this study, we assume that debt ratios start at the midpoint between the maximum and minimum 
values for the assumed initial credit rating category. Credit ratings are generally assumed to change 
when simulated debt ratios cross the min-max boundaries. However due to the fact that the 
distribution of debt to value ratios of G and H companies is very similar, the debt to value ratio at 
which firms are assumed to default is set at 0.96. This level is approximately equal to the mean for 
defaulting firms. Increasing (decreasing) this critical debt to value ratio reduces (increases) simulated 
loan default rates. 
2.3.4.   Banks’ Recovery Rate on Defaulted Private Sector Loans 
The recovery rate on defaulted business and consumer loans (“private sector loans”) is an 
important risk factor.  Variables affecting the recovery rate include the seniority and security of the 
loans, the asset and liability structure of the company, the potential to reorganized a defaulted 
business into a profitable going concern, the industry, bank lending policies, bank collection policies, 
the aggregate volume of defaulted loans that must be resolved
25, and importantly the efficiency of the 
legal system in resolving loan defaults.   
In the case of Brazil historically the legal system was viewed as taking an exceptionally long 
time to resolve loan defaults and bankruptcies and that the recovery rate on defaulted loans was low.  
For the current study when we wish to model historical distributions of bank returns or model 
potential extreme systemic banking system problems we will assume an average recovery rate on 
defaulted bank loans of 15 percent.  
In June 2005 a decade long effort to modernize Brazil’s bankruptcy laws came into effect. 
This change is projected to improve the recovery prospects for defaulted Brazilian bank loans (see 
Eccles, 2005).  Thus for the current study when we undertake forward looking risk assessments for 
Brazilian banks and the banking system our base case assumption is that the recovery rate on 
                                                
23 Merton (1974) defined leverage ratio as debt over equity. To simplify, for comparison purpose, the 
algebraically equivalent debt over total market capitalization (i.e. debt ratio), is defined as [book value of 
debt/(book value of debt + market value of equity)], is utilized in this study. 
24 This information is compiled by the Central Bank of Brazil and the results presented in Table are published in 
Barnhill, Souto, and Tabak (2003). 
25 For example in the case of Japanese financial system problems during the 1990’s and early 2000’s, when a 
very large volume of loans defaulted, the recovery rate was estimated to be in the 20 to 30 percent range (See 
Barnhill, Papapanagiotou, and Souto (2004).   
15defaulted private sector loans is drawn from a beta distribution
26 with a mean value of .45 and a 
standard deviation of .25. However we will also report simulation results based on an assumed 
recovery rate of 15 percent to illustrate the potential impacts of a lower recovery rate on systemic 
banking system risk levels. 
2.3.5.   Valuing the Bank’s Loan Portfolio 
After simulating the loans’ future credit rating their values are calculated using the simulated 
term structure of interest rates appropriate for each risk class. If the loan is simulated to default, the 
recovery rate on the loan is set at either the higher (45 percent) or lower (15 percent) levels discussed 
above. If the loan is denominated in a foreign currency then its numeraire currency value is calculated 
by multiplying the simulated loan value by the simulated foreign exchange rate that by construction is 
also a correlated stochastic variable. 
2.4.   Simulated Credit Transition Matrix 
With the above model calibration Barnhill, Souto, and Tabak (2003) simulated the credit 
transition matrix for Brazilian business loans and compared this simulated transition matrix to the 
historical credit transition matrix for two large Brazilian banks (Table 2).  
Historical and simulated credit transition matrices for these two banks are very similar to one 
another. The most important difference being that the simulated default rates on AA and A rated loans 
is zero or close to zero, while the historical default rates have a small positive value. In order to 
provide a more precise measure of how close one transition matrix is to the other, we use the metrics 
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where  is the transition matrix,  PP P I     , I  is the identity matrix,  i O  is the   eigenvalue of 
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  For the historical CTM,  0.3294 SVD M   , while for the simulated CTM,  ,
resulting in  . As compared to values provide in Jafry and Shuermann (2004) for 
0.3306 SVD M  
0.0012 SVD M ' 
                                                
26 Utilizing a beta distribution allows the average recovery rate to fall within 0 percent and 100 percent while 
maintaining the same mean and standard deviation. 
16bootstrapped SVDs, this value is a strong indicator that the two CTMs are indeed very similar to one 
another
27.
2.5.   Modeling Bank Capital Ratios 
The previous analysis allows the market value of the bank’s assets, liabilities, equity, and 
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where t MVE  is the simulated market value of the bank’s equity at time t,   is the simulated market 
value of the i’th asset at time t which reﬂect the simulated ﬁnancial environment variables (e.g., 
interest rates, exchange rates, equity prices, and etc.) and where appropriate, the simulated credit 
rating of the borrower, 
, it A
, it L is the simulated market value of the i’th liability at time t which reﬂect the 
simulated ﬁnancial environment variables (e.g., interest rates, exchange rates, etc.).  
The bank’s simulated capital ratio reﬂect changes in the value of assets and liabilities as well 
as bank net interest income, operating costs, and taxes over the simulation period. The simulated 
prices are used to recalculate the value of the bank capital under each simulation run (i.e. scenario). If 
for example, the bank made a loan in a foreign currency and the loan will be repaid in full in a year, 
the value of the loan will be given by the discounted value of the equivalent Real amount of the loan. 
In order to recalculate the value of the loan under each scenario, the simulated interest rate for that 
scenario is used in the present value formula and the simulated value of the exchange rate for that 
scenario is used to convert the simulated value of the loan into the domestic currency. This produces a 
new simulated value of the loan for each scenario.  
The ﬁnal outcome of the model after many simulation runs is an estimated distribution of the 
bank’s capital
4
to asset ratio, characterized by a mean, a standard deviation, a maximum and a 
minimum value, as well as a Value-at-Risk output indicating how frequently the bank’s capital to 
asset ratio fall is below certain thresholds (e.g. 3 percent) which is used to estimate the banks’ default 
probability. Declines in the capital ratio (i.e., potential losses) under each simulation run are estimated 
as the diěerence between the initial bank capital and the simulated capital ratio
28.
                                                
27 In Jafry and Shuermann (2004), average   ranged from -0.03491 to 0.01071, for transition probability 
matrices estimated using different methods, but over the same dataset of S&P ratings histories. 
SVD M '
28 It is important to note that we are modeling banks’ tier-1 (equity) capital ratio. 
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2.6.  Modeling Sovereign Risk 
The Government of Brazil is modeled as a large business borrower with an assumed debt to 
value ratio and an assumed market value of equity. The government’s market value of equity is 
assumed to be systematically related to returns on the Brazilian equity market index and to also have 
an idiosyncratic component. On each run of the simulation we estimate a new market value of equity 
and debt to value ratio for the GOB and if this value exceeds some critical level, then the GOB is 
assumed to default. The initial debt to value ratio, beta, and idiosyncratic risk components are selected 
to produce a targeted average sovereign default rate of 4.5 percent. The simulated sovereign defaults 
are thus systematically related to returns on the Brazilian equity market (and other correlated state 
variables) which are also systematically related to simulated defaults on private sector loans. Through 
this mechanism we end up modeling correlated sovereign and private sector loan defaults
29 which are 
also correlated with simulated financial and economic variables (e.g. equity returns, interest rates, 
foreign exchange rates, etc.). 
The impacts of a Government default on the banking system are varied, hard to predict in 
advance, and will be very dependent on the contemporaneous policies adopted by the Government at 
the time of any such default. It may be that the government would wish to expand its monetary base in 
order to repay domestic loans; this practice has well-known nocive effects on the economy, which 
might, eventually, spill-over to the banking system. On top of that, such default events are usually 
associated with major disruptions in the whole economy, affecting all sectors, and banks’ borrowers 
may become incapable of repaying some of their debts. It is also possible that banks will suffer losses 
on Government securities due to increases in the market’s required risk premium on Government 
debt, because the government may defer the payment of certain debts, or may force banks to accept 
new debt instruments with a lower market value (e.g. longer maturities, fixed rates, etc.). In any 
instance, even if the government does not explicitly default on its domestic debt, the banks may 
ultimately incur losses on the market value of its government debt portfolio. To be able to model such 
potential sovereign default impacts is not an easy task. No one knows for sure which set of actions 
will be taken by the government during such events. There are then innumerous possible outcomes for 
banks holding government debt, each of which will impact banks’ portfolios differently. Modeling the 
29 For more elaborate alternatives to the above method of modeling sovereign default risk, which could also be 
used in this type systemic bank risk assessment model, see Barnhill and Kopits (2004) and Barnhill (2006). 
18impact of sovereign defaults on banks and banking systems is clearly a topic on which we wish to 
conduct substantial additional research.  
For the present application we will use a matrix of some potential government default 
implications that will provoke additional losses on banks’ portfolios, through two different channels. 
First, even if banks face no losses on government securities, they may face additional losses on their 
business and consumer loans, as these sectors of the economy are impacted by major disruptions in 
the economy due to the sovereign default event. We conjecture that these events will impacts firms 
with different credit worthiness differently. That is, we assume that firms with higher credit quality 
are better prepared to handle these crisis events. The way we capture this differential impact is by 
imposing an increment in the default rate on private sector loans in each credit category. We assume 
three different scenarios: (i) businesses and individuals have a zero increment to their default rates; 
(ii) businesses and individuals in each credit risk category have an increase in their default rates equal 
to the average default rate of that credit risk category, and (iii) businesses and individuals in each 
credit risk category have an increase in their default rates equal to two times the average default rate 
of that credit risk category. The second channel incorporates losses directly on the government 
securities, by assuming that banks may lose 0 percent, 10 percent, or 25 percent of the market value of 
their government securities. The combination of all these possible outcomes lead to 9 potential 
scenarios banks may face in the event of a government default. While these scenarios are far from 
exhausting the innumerous alternatives, they do provide what we believe to be a reasonable range for 
the incremental losses banks may face due to a Government default
30.  In addition to study the 
importance of the recovery rate on defaulted private sector loans in systemic risk assessments we 
repeat the above analysis for both the higher (45 percent) and lower (15 percent) assumed recovery 
rates.
2.7.  Modeling Inter-Bank Default Risk 
The impact of inter-bank exposure is modeled, in a second step after the Monte Carlo 
simulations are done, and the initial bank risk assessments completed
31. For this purpose, we first 
aggregate the 28 banks into three groups according to their individual risk characteristics and then 
simulate them simultaneously
32. Since we do not have precise information on inter-bank 
30 Development of a systematic methodology for modeling the correlated distributions of direct losses on 
government debt and incremental losses on private sector loans is a high priority for future research. 
31 Each simulation run produces a random path over a certain time-period (e.g. one year). To minimize 
computational effort and time, balance sheet accounts are recalculated only at the end of the time-period. 
32 The current version of the ValueCalc programs only allows for simulating three banks simultaneously (for 
computer memory reasons), although it has the potential to simulate any number of banks simultaneously. 
19borrowers/lenders identities, we assume inter-bank lending to be proportional to the three aggregate 
banks total assets. We then assume, in a second lance, that if one bank falls below a 3 percent capital 
ratio
33, then it becomes incapable of honoring its inter-bank obligations and defaults on them. Only 50 
percent of these inter-bank obligations are assumed to be recovered, with subsequent impact on other 
banks’ capital ratios. Eventually, one bank’s failure can induce other banks to become insolvent as 
well, depending upon the size of inter-bank exposure, combined with other factors, as mentioned 
above. It is important to keep in mind the significance of modeling all of the correlated risks above. In 
particular during times of economic stress it is likely that default losses on private sector loans will 
increase, market volatility and risk will also likely increase, and so will the risk of sovereign default. 
Thus, should a sovereign default occur, it will likely be at a time when many banks are already being 
adversely impacted by other risk factors. This is just the time when the failure of several banks could, 
through inter-bank credit defaults, precipitate a number of additional bank defaults and a systemic 
banking crisis. 
2.8.  Modeling Systemic Bank Risk 
Finally, we assess the systemic risk of the Brazilian financial system, in different ways. We 
first consider a single bank that is a combination of all 28 banks, then we simulate the three aggregate 
banks simultaneously and include the risk component associated with inter-bank default (inter-bank 
propagation channel). Our results show that aggregating the banks into one single bank 
underestimates the cost associated with a systemic risk crisis, when compared to the three-bank 
simultaneous simulation case. For example, if we assume the government to default and banks suffer 
a 25 percent average loss in the market value on government securities and an incremental default rate 
on business and consumer loans equal to two times the average simulated default rate per risk 
category, then the single-bank default rate is 2.2 percent, with an associated average cost to bring its 
capital ratio back to 0.08 of 0.055 of total assets. Under the same scenario, the probability of having 
the two groups with the lower credit profile defaulting at the same time is 2.9 percent, with an 
associated cost of 0.111 of the two banks’ total assets. Because one of the three groups is very well-
capitalized, it will only default when it incurs even larger losses on government securities, should the 
government default. While the above assumptions are somewhat arbitrary the analysis highlights the 
danger of modeling the financial system as one single financial institution and not accounting for the 
differential risk characteristics of various banks and for the inter-bank channel, through which a 
systemic crisis may propagate. 
33 Anecdotal evidence suggests that banks generally start having solvency problems when their capital ratio 
(total asset minus total liabilities, over total assets) falls below 3 percent. 
203.   Simulation Results 
Our risk assessments relate to four sets of Monte Carlo simulations: (i) individual banks, with 
no government default, with volatilities and correlations estimated over the 2000-2004 period, (ii) 
individual banks, with no government default; (iii) individual banks, with government default; and 
(iv) systemic banking system risk. In the first set of simulations our goal is to compare simulated and 
historical rates of return on bank equity and assets. In the second and third sets of simulations we wish 
to compare individual bank risk with and without sovereign default risk. We also compare the risk 
assessment produced by our portfolio simulations with the bank credit ratings provided by Moody’s 
and Standard and Poor’s. Using the risk assessments from the third set of simulations we group banks 
into three risk categories and construct three aggregate banks. In the fourth set of simulations we 
undertake a simultaneous risk analysis for a single aggregate bank and subsequently three aggregate 
banks with different risk levels to assess systemic banking system risk (i.e. the likelihood of multiple 
banks defaults) reflecting market, credit, sovereign, and inter-bank risk.  These correlated market and 
credit risk assessments are based on analyses of the output from 2,000 simulation runs.   
3.1.   Individual Banks, No Government Default, Higher Volatilities 
  The first set of our risk simulations focus on 11 Brazilian private domestic banks
34, which we 
will use for model validation purpose. The idea is to compare means and standard deviations for 
simulated return on average equity (ROAE) and return on average assets (ROAA), with historical 
distributions of reported ROAE and ROAA. Given that this data is not available for a long period in 
Bank Scope (generally just the previous 8 eight years), and considering the set of events that have 
recently occurred in Brazil, in particular the aftermath of Russian crisis (1999) that culminated on 
government authorities dropping the currency peg that was the main anchor of the stabilization plan 
put forth in 1994, we will focus our analysis on the 2000-2004 period, which provides 5 years of 
annual historical data on ROAE and ROAA. Since in this period the GOB has not experienced any 
default on its debt obligations, we will simulate these 11 banks, over a 1-year period (December 2004 
to December 2005) assuming that the GOB does not default.  As the 2000-2004 period precedes the 
change in Brazilian bankruptcy laws we assume a 15 percent recovery rate on defaulted private sector 
loans.
  To make this simulation exercise as consistent as possible, we have estimated a new set of 
volatilities and correlations, using monthly data for all stochastic financial environment variables and 
over the same 2000-04 period. Both volatilities and correlations are substantially different than the 
34 These are hypothetical banks constructed using publicly available data in the Brazilian Central Bank website. 
It is an effort to replicate main Brazilian banks characteristics and to make this exercise as close to reality as 
possible. 
21ones estimated for the 2003-04 period which are used in all of the other simulations reported in this 
paper. In general, using data for 2000-2004 increases the volatility significantly, which is not 
surprising, given the Argentina default in 2001 and the election in Brazil in 2002, which both had a 
significant impact on the volatilities of the underlying state variables as discussed above. Higher 
equity volatility broadens the distribution of simulated company D/V ratios and, subsequently, 
increases simulated default rates impacting banks portfolios, balance sheets, and, ultimately, 
simulated ROAE and ROAA. 
We focus on ROAE and ROAA ratios, because they are intuitive and widely used measures 
of banks’ profitability. To be able to simulate distributions for these ratios that are reasonably close to 
historical values, is an important achievement in the context of our simulation framework and 
highlights the integrated market and credit risk capabilities of the simulation methodology we utilize.  
  In order to investigate whether simulated means and standard deviations for ROAA and 
ROAE are unbiased estimators for historical means and standard deviations, we perform the following 
regressions:
,1 , hi si ROAAavg ROAAavg 1 E H     (13) 
,2 , hi si ROAAsd ROAAsd 2 E H     (14) 
,3 , hi si ROAEavg ROAEavg 3 E H     and  (15)
,4 , hi si ROAEsd ROAEsd 4 E H    , (16) 
where , hi ROAAavg , , hi ROAAsd , , hi ROAEavg , , hi ROAEsd  are averages and standard deviations 
for ROAA and ROAE, using annual historical data during the 2000-04 period, for each bank i  in our 
validation sample, and  , s i ROAAavg , , s i ROAAsd , , s i ROAEavg , , s i ROAEsd , are averages and 
standard deviations for ROAA and ROAE using the 2000 simulated values generated as of December 
2005. We then use a Wald type-statistics for testing the null 1 E   . (If  1 E    the simulated return 
means and standard deviations are unbiased predictors of the historical return means and standard 
deviations). We also performed one more regression using all observations for both ROAA and 
ROAE, averages and standard deviations (pooled observations). Results for these regressions are 
presented in Table 4. These results show that the: (i) beta coefficient is usually close to one (exception 
is beta for ROAA standard deviation regression, which is equal to 1.61); (ii) adjusted 
2 R  is quite high 
in all regressions (again, the smallest one is the adjusted 
2 R  for ROAA standard deviation regression, 
which is equal to 0.47); (iii) in all regressions, the Wald Statistics fail to reject the null, 1 E   , at 95 
percent confidence level. 
22  While encouraging, these results need to be taken with care for several reasons. First, 
historical means and standard deviations are calculated using only 5 annual observations (from to 
2000 to 2004). Thus, adding or dropping one observation can make a significant difference in 
estimating averages and standard deviations, particularly if we consider that these banks operate in a 
volatile environment and that Brazil has experienced some acute shocks recently (e.g. the fear of 
contagion from Argentina default). Second, we use observations for only 11 banks to run the 
regressions (only pooled regression uses 44 observations). Adding or dropping banks from the sample 
will likely affect the results (for the better or for the worse) as well. Finally, we are using means and 
standard deviations for historical ROAA and ROAE, estimated on the temporal direction, to regress 
against means and standard deviations for simulated ROAA and ROAE, generated for a slice of time 
(as of December 2005). The underlying assumption is that historical ROAA and ROAE are stationary 
and thus it makes sense to compare the different measures. It is virtually impossible to test whether 
ROAA and ROAE are stationary or not, with such small time series. 
3.2.   Individual Banks, No Government Default, Lower Volatilities 
  The second set of our simulations comprises all 28 banks, simulated individually, assuming 
that the GOB will never default on its domestic debt over the simulation horizon (1-year)
35.
Simulation results for this group are presented in Table 5, and a few comments are in order. First, 
reported VaR levels indicate the percentage of time that simulated bank capital ratios fall above a 
certain threshold. For example, Bank 20 VaR at 99% level is 0.154, indicating that 1 percent of the 
time the simulated capital ratio for Bank 20 fell below 0.154. Second, with a few exceptions, 
Brazilian banks are well capitalized. For example, Bank 12 has a 0.252 capital ratio and Bank 6 has 
0.382. Banks with capital ratios below 0.07 are Bank 5 (0.059), Bank 14 (0.062), Bank 16 (0.065), 
Bank 21 (0.067), and Bank 23 (0.063). Third, in general, if we do not factor government default into 
the simulations, Brazilian banks are profitable and have an increasing capital ratio on average over the 
1-year simulation period. The exception is Bank 6, which has an average simulated capital ratio of 
0.372, against an initial capital ratio of 0.382. Bank 6 is the bank with smallest interest rate spreads 
after we adjust the spreads so as to match historical reported net interest margin. Bank 7, Bank 7, and 
Bank 19 have a drop of only 0.01 relatively to the initial capital ratio, which we still consider to be 
within the simulation error range. None of the banks produce simulated capital ratios that would 
indicate significant default risk problems over a one-year time step. Even the minimum simulated 
capital ratios are well above the 3 percent level which we have set as the critical bank capital level at 
which banks begin to default. Although in several cases the simulated capital ratios are below a 0.08 
                                                
35 In fact as we shall see in the next section, countries at the same sovereign rating as Brazil (B) have a one-year 
default rate of 4.5 percent on average in the past 10 years, according to Klaar, Rawkins, and Riley (2004). 
23capital ratio on an economic capital basis (e.g. Bank 5 with minimum capital ratio of 0.043, Bank 7 
with 0.050, and Bank 21 with 0.057, among others). Finally, simulated capital ratios have a small 
standard deviation for all banks, ranging from 0.001 (Bank 19) to 0.007 (Bank 13 and Bank 24). 
Given the substantial amount of government securities held by these banks, this result is not 
surprising at all. Bank 9 holds a more modest fraction of government securities. However, the credit 
quality of its portfolio is fairly high, with a corresponding small default rate. 
3.3.   Individual Banks, Government Default
36
  Since Brazilian banks hold a significant amount of GOB debt, it is very important to assess 
the impact of correlated sovereign risk on banks’ default probabilities. For this exercise, we propose 
to model government default in a relatively simplistic way, which we claim can still provide 
reasonable insights on banks’ exposure to sovereign risk. In particular in the current study we model 
the GOB as if it were a large corporate borrower, subject to systematic and idiosyncratic risk factors. 
When determining these parameters, we need to be able to reproduce reasonably closely the rate at 
which a sovereign country like Brazil is expected to default, given its current macroeconomic 
conditions. We also wish to capture appropriately the correlations between market risk, private sector 
loan defaults, and sovereign defaults.  
For this purpose we draw heavily from a recent study published by Klaar, Rawkins, and Riley 
(2004) on sovereign Rating and default rates, by surveying the government default cases that have 
been witnessed in the past 10 years, for the countries they assign sovereign rating (Table 6). The 
definition of government default itself is neither simple nor consensual
37. Fitch defined default as a 
failure to make timely payment of principal and/or interest on either: (i) rated foreign currency debt; 
or (ii) other material foreign currency debt obligations, such as Paris or London Club liabilities. We 
believe the Fitch study provides useful guidelines as to the estimated default rates. We present in 
Table 3 the government default cases studied by Fitch, after 1998. Of 6 cases, only two countries have 
been downgraded to a D category, after the default event. One case is Argentina, which defaulted on 
over US$ 70 Billion (sovereign foreign currency bonds), in 2001, and was downgraded from BB to 
DDD (recovery expected to be around 90 percent - 100 percent). The other is Moldova, which 
                                                
36 This study was conducted when Brazil was rated as B. Currently Brazil is being rated as BB+ by most rating 
agencies. With this higher credit rating (and consequently lower expected sovereign default probability) if this 
study we repeated today then our bank and systemic banking system risk estimates would be expected to be 
lower.   
37 Indeed, considering that governments have the option to issue money to pay domestic debt, it is even more 
troublesome to define government default on domestic debt. In this study we keep the matters simple and 
simulate government default at an average rate (4.5 percent) consistent with what Klaar, Rawkins, and Riley 
(2004) report for sovereign debt default for countries graded by Fitch as B level (like Brazil). 
24defaulted on US$ 75 million of Eurobonds (later restructured and followed by a Paris Club deal), in 
2002, and was downgraded from CC to DD (50 percent - 90 percent expected recovery rate). Other 
countries, even though they fitted in the default definition above, were not downgraded to D 
categories. Indonesia was downgraded from BB+ to B- after rescheduling payments to Paris and 
London Clubs in 1998, while Uruguay was downgraded from B to B-, after a distressed debt episode 
(over US$ 5 billion of foreign currency sovereign debt) in 2003. Russia was more severely 
downgraded, from BB+ to CCC, in 1998, with a default on its domestic debt that quickly spilled over 
to foreign currency debt as well. Ukraine defaulted on Eurobonds in 1999, prior to the first public 
Fitch rating. However, Fitch has maintained a shadow rating of B before the episode and B- after the 
episode. The importance of these ratings go beyond potential interest rates charged on sovereign debt 
for these countries, or giving potential investors a sense of country risk level. For the present study, 
using the model discussed earlier, we chose to produce GOB average default rates that are comparable 
to the average default rates of countries sovereign debt rated at the same risk level as Brazil (B). We 
assume the GOB to default at an average rate of 4.5  on foreign currency loans, consistent with Klaar, 
Rawkins, and Riley (2004). In the event of such a default, we assume the value of domestic debt may 
also be adversely affected. 
An important issue in the event of a sovereign default on its foreign debt is the government’s 
willingness/ability to honor its domestic debt obligations. While the government may want to expand 
its monetary base in order to repay domestic loans, this practice has well-known nocive effects on the 
economy, which might, eventually spill-over into the banking system. It is also possible that the 
government may force debt holders to change their contracts for something that has a lower market 
value than the original ones. In any instance, even if the government does not fully default on its 
domestic debt, the banks may ultimately incur market value losses. To be able to model this explicitly 
is not an easy task. No one knows for sure which set of actions will be taken by the government 
during such events. There are then innumerous possible outcomes for banks each of which will impact 
banks’ portfolios differently. Given this limitation, we propose to construct a matrix of some potential 
government default implications that will provoke additional losses on banks’ portfolios, through two 
different channels. The first channel incorporates losses directly on the government securities, by 
assuming that banks may lose 0 percent, 10 percent, or 25 percent of the market value of their 
government securities. Such losses may result from increases in required market interest rates and 
interest rate spreads, because the government may defer payment of the debt, or may force banks to 
change the terms of the debt in ways that reduce its value. 
In addition government default events are usually associated with major disruptions in the 
whole economy, affecting all sectors, and banks’ borrowers may become incapable of repaying some 
of their debts. We conjecture that these events will impact firms with different credit worthiness 
differently. That is, we assume that firms with higher credit quality are better prepared to handle these 
25crisis events. The way we capture the differential impact of a sovereign default is by imposing an 
increase on the default rate on private sector loans in different credit categories. We assume three 
different scenarios: (i) businesses and individuals have a zero increment to their default rates; (ii) 
businesses and individuals in each credit risk category have an increase in their default rates equal to 
the average default of that credit risk category
38, and (iii) businesses and individuals in each credit 
risk category have an increase in their default rates equal to two times the average default of that 
credit risk category.  
The combination of all these possible outcomes lead to 9 potential Government and private 
sector incremental loan loss scenarios bank may face in the event of a government default. While 
these scenarios are far from exhausting the innumerous alternatives, they do provide a reasonable 
range for incremental bank loan losses.  As indicated earlier in cases where we assess systemic 
banking system risk we will evaluate these 9 potential loan loss scenarios for two assumed private 
sector defaulted loan recovery rates (15 percent and 45 percent). 
In Tables 7 to 9 we report the average simulated bank default rate
39, the associated average 
cost to bring banks’ capital ratio back to a 0.08 level (estimated only for the times when the bank 
defaults), and the 99% VaR capital level (banks have 1 percent probability of having their capital 
ratios falling below this level). Given that banks hold a significant amount of government securities, 
bank default rates start to appear significant only when there is some degree of losses on government 
securities. For example, if banks lose an average of 10 percent in the market value of their 
government debt, then 6 banks (e.g. Bank 5 and Bank 16) will have a default  rate of around 4 percent 
to 5 percent. If banks lose 25 percent of the market value of their government securities, then 15 
banks (e.g. Bank 3, Bank 8, Bank 10, etc.) will have a default  rate of around 4 percent to 6 percent. In 
either of these cases (i.e. 10 percent or 25 percent loss rates) the bank failures would result from a 
sovereign default and thus would be highly correlated and could precipitate a systemic banking 
system problem. Interestingly, some banks will not default at all (e.g. Bank 1 and Bank 2), even in the 
worst case scenario that we analyze in this paper (losing 25 percent of the market value of government 
securities and suffering incremental defaults on business and individual loans equal to twice their 
average historical default rates). These banks either are highly capitalized, and thus capable of 
absorbing a larger shock on the government securities, or they have a balance between government, 
business, and consumer loans that allows them to diversify the risk of a potential government default, 
along with a high net interest margin stemming from large interest rate spreads on business and 
                                                
38 See Table 2, which provides the average one-year historical default rate on Brazilian bank loans with various 
credit qualities. 
39 Based on anecdotal evidence, we consider banks to default whenever its simulated capital ratio equals 0.03 or 
less. The methodology, however, is flexible enough to deal with different default thresholds. 
26consumer loans. The average cost (as percentage of total assets) to bring the banks back to a 0.08 
capital level whenever they default is usually pretty high. For example, if the GOB defaults and the 
banks lose 25 percent of the market value of their government securities, this ‘bail-out’ cost ranges 
from 0.055 of total assets (Bank 13) to 0.278 (Bank 22). Again, the large amount of government 
securities held by Brazilian banks make them quite vulnerable in the event of a sovereign default, 
potentially requiring large amounts of capital to bail them out. The simulated 99% VaR capital ratios 
just reinforce the size of the losses these banks face in the event of government default. If banks lose 
25 percent of the market value of government securities, capital ratios may range from 0.248 (Bank 6) 
to -0.199 (Bank 22). 
While having the previously noted limitations, this approach to modeling correlated market, 
credit, and sovereign risk highlights the danger of the exposure of many Brazilian banks to very high 
levels of GOB securities. It is true that Brazil has been implementing more responsible fiscal and 
monetary policies, controlling the inflation, and obtaining important positive balance in 
exports/imports, among other positive indicators. However, Brazil is still an emerging economy, 
vulnerable to flow of capitals, with a huge stock of debt (both domestic and foreign)
40. Thus, 
government securities are not free of risk, and the correlated risk of government default should be 
accounted for.
3.4.   Rating Brazilian Banks 
  We now will compare the simulated results obtained in the previous section with rating 
agency ratings of Brazilian banks
41. We will focus our attention on a single output derived from the 
simulations including the risk of a sovereign default. In particular we will look at the 99% confidence 
level capital ratio (99% VaR level) for the scenario where in the event of a sovereign default banks 
lose 10 percent of the market value of their government securities, experience an incremental increase 
in defaults on their private sector loans equal to twice the average default rate, and have a 45 percent 
average recovery rate on defaulted private sector loans. This measure embeds both the default 
probability and the size of associated monetary loss and is consistent with what the rating agencies 
also utilize for rating banks, businesses, and sovereigns. For this purpose, we will divide our sample 
of banks into three groups, according to their 99% VaR capital level. Group 1 will be comprised by 
banks with 99% VaR capital ratios less than 0.07, Group 2 with banks with 99% VaR capital ratios 
between 0.07 and 0.13, and Group 3 with 99% VaR capital ratios above 0.13. Since the 99% VaR sets 
                                                
40 Total debt to GDP is around 55 percent, as of December 2004 (source: Government Financial Statistics, IMF). 
41 Since business and consumer loans, as well as 90 percent of government loans are modeled with 1-year 
maturity, we use the ratings for the short-term debt instruments that these banks hold.  
27the threshold below which banks capital ratio will fall 99% of the time, the lower the 99% VaR level, 
the closer the bank is to the critical 0.03 level and the higher the probability of default (thus the riskier 
the bank). 
  Results from our credit classification are compared in Table 10, with the ratings from 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. Our ratings are generally consistent with Moody’s and Standard 
and Poor’s. For example, we rate 12 of the 16 banks in the intersection set similarly to Moody’s and 7 
of the 10 banks in the intersection set similarly to Standard and Poors, while we only rate 9 of the 18 
banks in the intersection set similarly to Fitch. 
  We want to stress that our results should be taken only as an additional piece of evidence to 
evaluate the reliability of the portfolio simulation risk assessments. First, there are some data 
limitations underlying our analysis, since we have not obtained all the information that would be 
desirable for this study. Importantly, detailed information on banks’ interest rate spreads (an important 
component in Brazilian banks risk assessment) have not been made available to us. Second, our 
classification only takes into account the 99% VaR level capital ratio. We do not combine this piece 
of information with any other information on banks’ balance sheet and portfolio composition, as the 
rating agencies do. Finally, we have modeled government default in a relatively simplistic way. 
Barnhill and Kopits (2004), and Barnhill (2006) have shown the possibility of modeling government 
balance sheets in more detail using a similar PSA methodology. In spite of these limitations, we 
believe our methodology presents a plausible approach for assessing correlated market, credit, and 
sovereign risk for individual banks. As we will discuss in the next section we believe it also provides 
an opportunity to assess systemic banking system risk, which includes all of the above correlated risks 
in a simultaneous analysis for multiple banks plus the risk of correlated inter-bank defaults. 
3.5.   Systemic Banking System Risk 
  For assessing systemic banking system risk, we will consider two cases. First, we aggregate 
the 28 banks into one single bank. Second we aggregate banks according to their risk rating, in the 
three groups described above. Aggregated balance sheet accounts were obtained by simple addition 
from all banks in each group, while loan credit quality distributions and assets and liability maturity 
structures were obtained by a weighted average (size of each category relatively to total assets, in each 
bank).
283.5.1.   One Single Aggregate Bank 
  The simulation results for a single aggregate bank (Table 11 and Table 12) are consistent with 
what we have obtained for individual banks. When we model correlated market and private sector 
loan credit risk, but do not consider government default, simulated capital ratios are comfortably 
above an assumed 0.08 target capital level, with small standard deviation (0.003). This result is 
intuitive given the substantial amount of government securities that are collectively held by the 28 
banks in our simulation sample. Because the single aggregate bank has a 0.154 initial capital ratio it 
does not face solvency problems when a sovereign default imposes market value losses on 
government securities of 10 percent. Table 12 indicates that a 25 percent loss rate on Government 
securities, in the event of a sovereign default, the default rate on the single aggregate bank may reach 
3 percent (3.6 percent) with assumed average recovery rates on private sector loans of 45 percent (15 
percent).  The associated cost to bring the single-bank capital back to a 0.08 level averages 5.7 percent 
(6.1 percent) of the bank’s total assets. The 99% VaR capital ratio also deteriorates substantially. 
Under the no-government- default assumption it is 0.147, while it drops to 0.021 (0.016) under the 
above sovereign default scenario when the average recovery rates on defaulted private sector loans are 
45 percent (15 percent). 
While used frequently, modeling systemic risk via a single aggregate bank has significant 
limitations. First it masks the fact that under certain conditions (e.g. 10 percent loss rate on 
government securities) a number of individual banks could fail simultaneously
42. Second this 
approach does not account for inter-bank exposures that can trigger sequential failures. Still, the 
simulated results do show the importance of modeling correlated sovereign risk not only at an 
individual bank level, but also, and perhaps most importantly, at a systemic level. 
3.5.2.   Multiple Aggregate Banks 
So far we have simulated the banks individually and taken account of correlated market, 
credit, and sovereign risk. However we have not taken into account one important channel for 
propagating a systemic crisis, through inter-bank credit exposures. For this purpose, we will simulate 
the 3 aggregated banks (Groups 1, 2, and 3) simultaneously, under the same financial and economic 
environment
43. Then we will examine the simulated capital ratios for all three banks to determine if 
one or more banks fail. In that event we will then calculate the default impacts on other banks as the 
                                                
42 Also, we are simulating only 28 Brazilian banks (70 percent of financial system total assets). Including more 
banks would certainly push the cost for bailing the financial system out to a higher level. 
43 The choice of using three banks as opposed to all 28 banks was made primarily because of memory 
limitations in the Excel spreadsheet application of the ValueCalc software. Relieving such memory is an area of 
current work. 
29failed banks become incapable of repaying their inter-bank debts. This exercise will be explained in 
more detail in section 3.5.2.2. Before we get there, however, it is useful to describe the groups 
separately and to simulate them individually, to have a more precise understanding of their default 
risk.
3.5.2.1.   Individual Aggregate Banks 
  Simulated capital ratios, without sovereign risk (Table 13), show that all three groups of 
banks are profitable and on average have increasing capital ratios. When sovereign risk is considered 
(Table 14), then only Group 3 survives all our simulated scenarios (same as for the individual banks). 
Group 1 has a small non-zero default probability at a 10 percent loss rate on government securities.  
Group 2 also has a non-zero default rate when the assumed losses in the market value of Government 
debt increases from 10 percent to 25 percent. Under the scenario of 25 percent average losses on 
government securities and a 45 percent average recovery rate on defaulted private sector loans, Group 
1 defaults at an average rate of 0.048 and Group 2 defaults at rates in the range of 0.1 percent to 1.8 
percent. The average cost of ‘bailing-out’ these banks is large, for Group 1 it surpasses the 12 percent 
of total assets required to bring its capital ratio back to a 0.08 level. For Group 2 the average bail-out 
cost it is around 5 to 6 percent of its total assets.  Under the assumption of a lower 15 percent recovery 
rate on defaulted private sector loans, group 1’s and group 2’s default probabilities and bailout costs 
increase.
  Another important risk measure, the 99% VaR capital level, provides an even more distinct 
picture. All banks have their 99% VaR capital level deteriorate when a sovereign default results in 
market value losses on government loan. If such loses reach 25 percent of market value then the 99% 
VaR capital levels for Groups 1, 2, and 3 falls to the range of -0.049 (-0.056), 0.035 (0.024), and 0.11 
(0.105) respectively for the 45 percent (15 percent) assumed recovery rates on defaulted private sector 
loans.
3.5.2.2.   Simultaneous Aggregate Banks 
For assessing systemic risk, we simulate correlated market, credit and sovereign risk for the 
three groups of aggregate banks simultaneously, under the same financial and economic environment. 
Then, in a second analytical step, we introduce the inter-bank propagation channel by adjusting each 
group’s simulated capital ratio whenever one of the other two groups’ simulated capital ratios fall 
below 0.03, using the information on inter-bank lending and assuming that the groups borrow money 
from others proportionately to their total assets. For example, Group 1 lends 3.6 percent of its total 
assets or equivalently R$5,503.60 Millions. Since Group 2 has total assets of R$551,250.10 Millions 
and the sum of Group 2 and Group 3 total assets is R$878,571.10 Millions, we assume that 
30R$551,250.10/R$878,571.10 = 0.63 of Group 1’s total inter-bank lending is lent to Group 2. The 
remaining 1 – 0.63 = 0.37 is lent to Group 3. 
For estimating the impact of inter-bank lending, when banks default, we assume inter-bank 
lending to be risk-free in the first step of the simulation
44. Then, we assume that when one group 
defaults, the other groups will recover at the same average as the other types of loans, 50 percent of 
the defaulted inter-bank loans. Obviously, higher recovery rates would certainly diminish the impact 
of inter-bank default. We then recalculate simulated total assets and simulated capital ratios, after 
deducting the defaulted amounts that are not recovered. With new simulated capital ratios, we 
replicate the same VaR analysis and also estimate default rates and the monetary cost to bring each 
group’s capital ratios back to 0.08 capital level. We also estimate the default rates and monetary cost 
when two banks and three banks default simultaneously. These results are presented in Tables 15A 
and 15B which assume a 45 percent and 15 percent recovery rate on defaulted private sector loans 
respectively.  A few comments are in order. First, in Table 15A, as expected, the inter-bank 
propagation channel moves from the riskier groups to the less risky groups. Second, because Group 3 
is very well capitalized and has the highest credit profile, it only defaults when incurring a much 
bigger loss on the government securities. Group 3 starts having solvency problems only when a 
sovereign default imposes a high average loss of 40 percent or more on the market value of 
government securities. This reveals another nocive facet of banks holding exceedingly large 
concentrations of government securities. In the event of a sovereign default, the government has 
constrained debt management alternatives. Should the government take actions that result in a heavy 
loss on the market value of government securities, then it may trigger a systemic risk default in the 
financial system. In the particular case of GOB, our analysis suggests that losses on government 
securities of 10 percent could create significant solvency problems for 5 or 6 out of 28 banks 
analyzed. Higher loss rates would of course create even larger systemic banking system risks. It is 
important to emphasize, however, that this number should be taken as illustrative, rather than 
definitive, given the limitations of the data we have utilized in this study and given its stylized 
framework. Since the amount of GOB securities in Brazilian balance sheets is much larger than the 
amount of business and consumer loans, the impact of incremental defaults on business and 
households has much smaller effects on banks’ default rates and monetary losses. Third, when we 
integrate the inter-bank risk into our framework, systemic default rates (i.e. risk of multiple bank 
failures in the same time period) are smaller compared to the individual banks’ default rates. For 
example at a 10% loss rate on government securities there is a zero probability of both Group 1 and 
Group 2 defaulting simultaneously.  At a 25% loss rate on government securities the probability of 
                                                
44 This is to avoid ‘double-counting’ the effect of inter-bank default. Initially, inter-bank loans were lodged as 
loans to the banking sector. 
31both Group 1 and Group 2 defaulting at the same time reaches 3.0 percent (3.9 percent) for average 
recovery rates on private sector loans of 45 percent (15 percent).  However, when the systemic event 
takes place, it is a lot more costly (as a percent of the assets of the defaulting banks) than previously 
assessed when simulating all 28 banks as a single bank. We have estimated the average cost to ‘bail-
out’ the single-bank to be 5.5 percent of its total capital under the scenario of a 25 percent average 
loss on government securities. Under the same scenario, the two riskier groups default at a rate in the 
range of 1.6 percent to 3.9 percent, with the average cost to bring their capital level back to 0.08 level 
equal to over 10 percent of their total assets.  A comparison of Tables 15 A and Table 15B which 
assume the higher (45 percent) and lower (15 percent) recovery rates on defaulted private sector loans 
illustrate the potential significance of this variable on systemic risk levels.   
4.   Concluding Remarks 
  We examine a sample of 28 of the largest Brazilian banks, in an effort to assess and quantify 
the risk of a systemic failure. Due to the potentially large and widespread economic impacts 
associated with bank failures, the assessment and management of systemic risk is a topic of great 
importance, particularly for countries that may not have the necessary financial resources to deal with 
the scope of this type of event.  We have simulated the banks individually, considering two different 
scenarios. In one we access correlated market and business loan credit risk, but assume the Brazilian 
government will never default on its debt obligations.  With few exceptions Brazilian banks perform 
very well in these simulations increasing their capital on average over the 1-year simulation horizon.  
  Regressions of simulated means and standard deviations of bank ROAE and ROAA on 
historical ROAE and ROAA means and standard deviations indicate that the simulated values are 
unbiased predictors of the historical ones. While this result needs to be taken with caution, it does 
show the capability of the PSA framework for modeling bank portfolio correlated market and credit 
risk and for simulating bank profitability distributions that are comparable to historical values. 
  In a second set of risk assessments we model correlated market, credit and sovereign risk. 
When the possibility of government default is considered the bank risk level changed substantially. 
For this purpose, we modeled the government as a large ‘corporate’ borrower impacted both by 
systematic risk in the form of stochastic equity market returns but also idiosyncratic return risk. We 
calibrate this model to produce an assumed average sovereign default rate of approximately 4.5 
percent, which is the average rate for sovereign rated debts in the same rating category of Brazil (B), 
according to a study done by Fitch. Our simulated defaults are systematically related to the returns on 
the Brazilian equity market and are thus correlated with general economic and financial conditions in 
Brazil and the simulated private sector loan defaults as well. 
32When considering sovereign risk, virtually all Brazilian banks generated simulated capital 
ratios that are much lower at a 99% confidence level, under the scenario of GOB imposing losses of 
10 percent to 25 percent on the government securities held by banks. At a 10 percent loss rate on 
government securities in the event of a sovereign default 6 of the 28 banks could fail. At a 25 percent 
loss rate on Government securities over half of the 28 banks could fail. One exception is Bank 9, 
which continued to produce reasonable simulated capital ratios even after considering sovereign risk. 
Bank 9 is a bank with a much smaller fraction of total assets invested in government securities. Thus, 
balancing better the portfolio between government, business, and consumer loans may not only yield 
more profitable loans portfolios, but also hedge the banks against a potential government default. 
GOB debt is not free of risk. Concentrated lending to an entity with a non-zero default probability 
creates well known portfolio concentration risk.  
  For conducting the systemic risk analysis, we grouped the banks in three categories. For this 
purpose, we used the results from the individual banks simulations (with government default) and 
have categorized banks in to three credit risk groups, based on their default risk. Once the groups have 
been created, we utilize two different approaches to measure systemic risk. First we aggregate all the 
banks in one single bank and simulate it individually, with the possibility of government default. 
Results for this approach show that the financial system might be dragged down by a government 
default only when the average loss on government securities is 25 percent or higher and that the cost 
to bail the system (to bring the average capital ratio to 0.08 level) is about 5.7 percent of the total 
assets, under this scenario. 
  In the second approach we simulate the three groups separately and simultaneously, under the 
same financial and economic environment. In this first pass we assess the impact of correlated market, 
credit, and sovereign risk on bank failure rates. In a second pass we assess the impact of inter-bank 
defaults on the remaining banks’ capital ratios to determine is they may also fail. Our results show 
that if a bank has heavy inter-bank credit exposure as compared to its initial capital then correlated 
inter-bank default losses may become “the straw that breaks the camel’s back”. More important, 
however, was the estimated bail-out cost when the three groups defaulted simultaneously (which 
amounts to a systemic failure of the Brazilian financial system). Even though the three banks may 
default only when facing much heavier losses on government securities (40 percent or more), the cost 
associated with such event reaches the range of 16 percent - 18 percent of total assets, for a recovery 
rate on business and customers’ loans around 45 percent (or in the range of 19 percent - 20 percent of 
total assets for a recovery rate of 15 percent). Our analysis also reveals another nocive facet of banks 
holding very large concentrations of government securities. In the event of default, the government 
has limited debt management alternatives. Should a government action cause significant loss in the 
market value of government securities, then it may trigger a systemic risk default in the financial 
system. In the particular case of GOB, in the event of government default, losses of 10 percent or 
33higher on government securities could have significant systemic banking system impacts. Since the 
amount of GOB securities in Brazilian balance sheets is much larger than the amount of business and 
consumer loans, the impact of incremental defaults on business and households have smaller impacts 
on banks’ default rates and monetary losses.  We also consider the impact of higher (45 percent) and 
lower (15 percent) average recovery rates on defaulted private sector loans.  We find in extreme 
events (sovereign defaults) should loan recovery rates on private sector loans be systematically 
depressed then banking system systemic risk increases significantly. 
  It is important to note that our results should be taken as illustrative rather than definitive 
assessment of Brazilian bank risk. This is so for two main reasons. First, from a data standpoint, we 
have not succeeded to obtain more detailed (and specific) information on banks portfolios and on 
interest rate spreads charged by Brazilian banks. This information is protected by a confidentiality law 
in Brazil and could not be provided to us because we have to map this information with public 
information such as banks’ financial statements, making it difficult to maintain bank confidentiality. 
Second, there are some methodological shortcomings on our analysis that can be improved with 
further work. A potentially significant limitation of the study is its assumption of an average 
sovereign default rate based on the Fitch rating. An attractive alternative would be to model the 
government’s balance sheets in a more complete manner (e.g. see Barnhill and Kopits (2004), or 
Barnhill (2006)) simultaneously with the country’s banking system. We believe this approach could 
improve both the average sovereign default rate estimation and the correlations between sovereign 
defaults and other risk factors. It may also give important new insights into optimal policy decisions 
to manage the risks of both sovereign defaults and systemic banking crises. It would also be 
interesting to improve further the methodology for modeling consumer loans in contrast to our 
approach of considering these loans to behave similarly to corporate loans. Finally, considering the 
significant operational expense ratio incurred by Brazilian banks, it would be quite interesting (and 
feasible) to model bank operating expenses as an additional correlated stochastic variable within the 
PSA framework.
Modeling correlated market, credit, sovereign, and inter-bank risk is a challenging task. All 
methodologies which might be used have limitations. In spite of the limitations we have identified 
above, we believe that the portfolio simulation methodology has been demonstrated to be able to deal 
with all of these correlated risks and to have the potential to provide important insights into individual 
bank and systemic banking system risk levels. 
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37Table 1
45
Debt Ratios, Betas and Unsystematic Risk used in the Portfolio Simulation Risk Assessments
This table provides results for distributional analysis of equity return risk characteristics, debt-to-value ratios, 
and internal bank credit ratings for all publicly traded Brazilian companies. 
AA A B C D E F Default
Debt-to-Value ratios
Lower bound 0.270 0.457 0.660 0.745 0.785 0.798 0.802 0.960
Target 0.405 0.620 0.810 0.838 0.890 0.902 0.894 0.960
Upper bound 0.516 0.706 0.865 0.917 0.922 0.935 0.940 0.960
Beta 0.67 0.85 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.36 -
Unsystematic risk 0.38 0.55 0.69 0.71 0.77 0.78 0.72 -
                                                




Comparison of historical credit transition matrices (CTM) for 2 large Brazilian banks with simulated CTM using 
stochastic volatilities and correlations. 
Panel A: Historical bank loan CTM for two large Brazilian banks.
AA A B C D E F Default
AA 0.901 0.064 0.021 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.007
A 0.119 0.690 0.102 0.047 0.021 0.003 0.004 0.014
B 0.033 0.110 0.719 0.092 0.020 0.005 0.006 0.016
C 0.033 0.042 0.153 0.674 0.047 0.009 0.013 0.031
D 0.011 0.019 0.040 0.051 0.602 0.039 0.054 0.184
E 0.001 0.078 0.005 0.008 0.041 0.558 0.040 0.268
F 0.008 0.006 0.012 0.023 0.031 0.076 0.568 0.276
Panel B: Simulated bank loan CTM using stochastic volatilities and covariances.
AA A B C D E F Default
AA 0.905 0.094 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
A 0.103 0.698 0.196 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
B 0.007 0.107 0.661 0.190 0.011 0.008 0.003 0.014
C 0.003 0.060 0.145 0.706 0.038 0.012 0.008 0.030
D 0.001 0.020 0.058 0.053 0.579 0.076 0.027 0.187
E 0.001 0.013 0.038 0.045 0.019 0.576 0.042 0.266
F 0.001 0.014 0.047 0.050 0.025 0.007 0.581 0.276
Panel C: Differences in probability between simulated and historical CTM's.
AA A B C D E F Default
AA -0.004 -0.030 0.020 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.007
A 0.016 -0.008 -0.094 0.046 0.021 0.003 0.004 0.013
B 0.026 0.003 0.058 -0.098 0.009 -0.003 0.004 0.002
C 0.030 -0.018 0.009 -0.032 0.009 -0.003 0.005 0.001
D 0.010 -0.001 -0.018 -0.002 0.023 -0.037 0.027 -0.003
E 0.000 0.066 -0.033 -0.037 0.022 -0.018 -0.002 0.002
F 0.007 -0.008 -0.035 -0.027 0.006 0.070 -0.013 0.001
                                                
46 From Barnhill and Souto (2007). 
39Table 3 
Brazilian Banks Balance Sheets – Main Statistics 
This table provides statistics on the stylized balance sheets used in the simulation to describe the main assets and 
liabilities accounts for Brazilian Banks, as of December 2004. 
Min. Median St. Dev. Max.
Capital and Liabilities
    Public Funding
        Domestic funding 26,0% 59,8% 17,9% 85,2%
        Foreign Funding 0,9% 7,3% 12,7% 54,5%
    Capital and Other Liabilities 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
        Non-interest bearing 3,9% 12,2% 12,4% 50,2%
    Equity and reserves less impairments 5,0% 10,1% 7,4% 38,4%
    Debt 0,0% 0,0% 1,3% 4,0%
Total 100,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
Assets
    Money 0,0% 1,3% 2,1% 9,4%
    Gold 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
    Domestic Risk-Free Loans 25,0% 54,2% 18,3% 90,5%
    Domestic business loans 1,0% 21,2% 13,9% 55,6%
    Domestic Individual loans 0,0% 3,5% 11,3% 57,0%
    Foreign Loans 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
    Equity Investments 0,0% 0,4% 0,8% 3,8%
    Real Estate Investments 0,0% 1,1% 1,2% 3,6%
    Other Assets 2,5% 10,6% 9,1% 44,4%
Total 100,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0%
Net Interest Margin 0,027 0,075 0,042 0,203
Net Non-Interest Income/Total Assets -0,080 -0,032 0,031 0,040
Source: BankScope and Central Bank of Brazil website.
Notes:
1. Public Funding, Debt Capital, Government Securities, and Foreign Loans are allocated to 
three different maturity buckets.
2. Domestic Business and Consumer Loans are spread over 10 sectors and 6 regions and each 
loan can be assigned a unique maturity.
3. In total approximately 450 stylized securities and loans are used to model each bank.
40Table 4 
ROAA and ROAE Regressions 
This table provides results for regressions performed over historical and simulated ROAA and ROAE means 
and standard deviations ( ,, hi x si x ROx ROx E H    ), with observations for 11 Brazilian private domestic 
banks. Between brackets we report the t-statistic for the beta coefficient. We also report the Wald statistics for 
testing the null  1 E    (last column). 
ȕ Adj. R
2 Wald Stat.
Panel A: ROAE Regressions
Mean 0,95 0,90 3,46
(9,79)
St. Dev. 1,26 0,70 3,73
(4,89)
Panel B: ROAA Regressions
Mean 1,25 0,89 3,58
(8,99)
St. Dev. 1,61 0,47 3,34
(3,12)
Panel C: Pooled Observations




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Government Default Cases in the Period of 1998-2003 
This table provides information on the government default cases as in the Klaar, Rawkins, and Riley (2004) study. 
Government default is defined as a failure to make timely payment of principal and/or interest on either: (i) rated 
foreign currency debt; or (ii) other material foreign currency debt obligations, such as Paris or London Club 
liabilities. 
Country Date Grade Description Date Before After
Argentina 1997 BB
Defaulted on over US$ 70 billions of sovereign 
foreign currency bonds. 2001 BB DDD
Indonesia 1997 BBB-
Rescheduled Paris and London Club operations 
in 1998. Further reschedules in 2000 and 2002. 1998 BB+ B-
Moldova 1998 B+
US$75 millions of Eurobonds restructured, 
followed by a Paris Club deal. 2002 CC DD
Russia 1996 BB+
Default on local currency debt in 1998, and 
quickly began to incur in arrears on foreign 
currency debt. 1998 BB+ CCC
Ukraine 2001 B+
Default on Eurobonds (event prior to the first 
rating
2). 1999 B+ B+
Uruguay 1995 BB+
Distressed debt exchange affecting over US$ 5 
billions of foreign currency sovereign debt. 2003 B B-
1. Source: Fitch Ratings website.
2. Even though this event is anterior to the first public sovereign rating, Fitch maintained a shadow





Simulated Default Probabilities: Individual Banks, Government Default 
Simulated default probabilities on individual banks. We assume various different scenarios. On the business and 
individuals loans, we assume that: (i) businesses and individuals have a zero increment to their default rates; (ii) 
businesses and individuals in each credit risk category have an increase in their default rates equal to the average 
default of that credit risk category, and (iii) businesses and individuals in each credit risk category have an increase 
in their default rates equal to two times the average default of that credit risk category. The second channel 
incorporates losses directly on the government securities, by assuming that banks may lose 0 percent, 10 percent, or 
25 percent of the market value of their government securities for a variety of reasons. The assumed recovery rate on 
defaulted private sector loans is 45% in these simulations. 
Losses on 










































Bank 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.046 0.046 0.046
Bank 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
Bank 5 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.038 0.045 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048
Bank 6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047
Bank 8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.038 0.041
Bank 9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.060 0.060 0.060
Bank 11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.045 0.045
Bank 12 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 13 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.005
Bank 14 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Bank 15 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.045 0.045
Bank 16 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041
Bank 17 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.035 0.037
Bank 18 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.049 0.049
Bank 20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 21 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Bank 22 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Bank 23 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.051 0.051
Bank 24 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 25 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.048 0.048
Bank 26 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Bank 27 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 28 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.046 0.046
46Table 8 
Simulated Average ‘Bail-Out’ cost: Individual Banks, Government Default 
Average ‘bail-out’ cost is the average capital (as percentage of total assets) necessary to bring banks’ capital ratio 
back to the 0.08 level, whenever they fall below 0.03 (assumed default). We assume various different scenarios. On 
the business and individuals loans, we assume that: (i) businesses and individuals have a zero increment to their 
default rates; (ii) businesses and individuals in each credit risk category have an increase in their default rates equal 
to the average default of that credit risk category, and (iii) businesses and individuals in each credit risk category 
have an increase in their default rates equal to two times the average default of that credit risk category. The second 
channel incorporates losses directly on the government securities, by assuming that banks may lose 0 percent, 10 
percent, or 25 percent of the market value of their government securities for a variety of reasons.  The assumed 
recovery rate on defaulted private sector loans is 45% in these simulations. 
Losses on 










































Bank 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.054 0.056 0.102 0.105 0.108
Bank 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.052
Bank 5 0.000 0.000 0.053 0.064 0.068 0.074 0.163 0.170 0.178
Bank 6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.077 0.078 0.080 0.197 0.198 0.200
Bank 8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.060 0.062
Bank 9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.059 0.061 0.150 0.153 0.156
Bank 11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.076 0.076
Bank 12 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 13 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.055 0.055
Bank 14 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.173 0.173 0.173
Bank 15 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.158 0.158 0.158
Bank 16 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.085 0.086 0.233 0.234 0.234
Bank 17 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.062 0.062
Bank 18 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.083 0.084
Bank 20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 21 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.088 0.091 0.094 0.239 0.243 0.248
Bank 22 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.278 0.278 0.278
Bank 23 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.085 0.086 0.087
Bank 24 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 25 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.068 0.070
Bank 26 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050
Bank 27 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bank 28 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.168 0.168 0.168
47Table 9 
Simulated 99% VaR Capital Ratio: Individual Banks, Government Default 
The 99% VaR simulated capital ratio is the threshold below which banks capital ratio will fall 1 percent of the time. 
We assume various different scenarios. On the business and individuals loans, we assume that: (i) businesses and 
individuals have a zero increment to their default rates; (ii) businesses and individuals in each credit risk category 
have an increase in their default rates equal to the average default of that credit risk category, and (iii) businesses 
and individuals in each credit risk category have an increase in their default rates equal to two times the average 
default of that credit risk category. The second channel incorporates losses directly on the government securities, by 
assuming that banks may lose 0 percent, 10 percent, or 25 percent of the market value of their government securities 
for a variety of reasons.  The assumed recovery rate on defaulted private sector loans is 45% in these simulations. 
Losses on 










































Bank 1 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.175 0.174 0.173 0.126 0.124 0.122
Bank 2 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.115 0.114 0.113 0.051 0.050 0.050
Bank 3 0.085 0.085 0.084 0.051 0.048 0.045 -0.026 -0.029 -0.032
Bank 4 0.152 0.151 0.151 0.128 0.125 0.122 0.058 0.055 0.052
Bank 5 0.058 0.056 0.053 0.011 0.005 -0.002 -0.092 -0.100 -0.108
Bank 6 0.365 0.364 0.364 0.335 0.334 0.333 0.248 0.247 0.245
Bank 7 0.065 0.064 0.063 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.121 -0.123 -0.124
Bank 8 0.103 0.103 0.102 0.084 0.083 0.080 0.018 0.016 0.013
Bank 9 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.210 0.208 0.206 0.190 0.188 0.186
Bank 10 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.040 0.038 0.035 -0.081 -0.085 -0.088
Bank 11 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.003 0.003 0.003
Bank 12 0.238 0.238 0.238 0.213 0.211 0.210 0.134 0.131 0.129
Bank 13 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.108 0.107 0.106 0.038 0.036 0.035
Bank 14 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.018 0.018 0.018 -0.094 -0.094 -0.094
Bank 15 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.086 0.086 0.086 -0.080 -0.080 -0.080
Bank 16 0.067 0.067 0.067 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.156 -0.157 -0.158
Bank 17 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.081 0.080 0.079 0.017 0.015 0.014
Bank 18 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.208 0.207 0.206 0.137 0.134 0.132
Bank 19 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.135 0.135 0.134 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
Bank 20 0.155 0.154 0.154 0.139 0.137 0.134 0.087 0.084 0.081
Bank 21 0.061 0.061 0.060 -0.012 -0.015 -0.019 -0.164 -0.169 -0.173
Bank 22 0.076 0.076 0.076 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.199 -0.199 -0.199
Bank 23 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.080 0.079 0.079 -0.011 -0.012 -0.013
Bank 24 0.140 0.139 0.139 0.136 0.134 0.133 0.113 0.110 0.107
Bank 25 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.073 0.071 0.069 0.010 0.007 0.005
Bank 26 0.161 0.161 0.161 0.132 0.131 0.130 0.046 0.045 0.043
Bank 27 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.177 0.175 0.173 0.112 0.110 0.107
Bank 28 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.040 0.040 0.040 -0.095 -0.095 -0.095
48Table 10 
Individual Banks – Credit Rating 
Brazilian banks are classified in to 3 credit risk categories, from Group 1 (less risky) to Group 3 (more 
risky), according to their 99% VaR capital ratios. Banks with 99% confidence level capital ratios less than 
0.07 were put in group 1, banks with 99% confidence level capital ratios between 0.07 and 0.13 were put in 
group 2, and Banks with 99% confidence level capital ratios over 0.13 put in Group 3. The size of the 
intersection set is represented in the parenthesis. 






I n v e s t m e n t  G r a d e 1 8109
Speculative Grade 0 15 10 19










Standard and Poor's 7
(10)
All 4 ratings 
methodologies 0
(7)
49 Table 11 
Simulated Capital Ratios: All 28 banks as One Single Bank 
No Government Default 
This table provides statistics and VaR values at different percentage levels, using 2000 simulated capital 
ratios, for a hypothetical single bank that aggregates all 28 banks in our Simulation sample. Aggregated 
balance sheet accounts were obtained by simple addition from all banks in each group, while loans 
distribution and assets and liabilities maturities structured were obtained by weighted average of each 
category in each bank relatively to total assets). In Panel A we present results for the case when the 
Brazilian Federal Government is assumed never to default, while in Panel B results are presented for the 
various scenarios, assuming the government may default on its domestic debt. Reported VaR levels indicate 
the percentage of time that simulated values fall above a certain threshold. For example, for the no 
government default case, VaR at 99% level is 0.147, indicating that 1 percent of the time simulated capital 
ratios for the single bank have fell below 0.147.  Assumed average recovery rate on defaulted private sector 






















Simulated Default Probabilities, Bail-Out Costs, and 99% Capital Ratios 
 Government Default Risk Considered 
 All 28 banks Modeled as a Single Bank
This table presents simulated default probabilities on groups of banks, average ‘bail-out’ cost as the average 
capital (as percentage of total assets) necessary to bring banks’ capital ratio back to 0.08 level, whenever 
they fall below 0.03 (assumed default), and the 99% VaR simulated capital ratio is the threshold below 
which banks capital ratio will fall 1 percent of the time. We assume various different scenarios. On the 
business and individuals loans, we assume that: (i) businesses and individuals have a zero increment to their 
default rates; (ii) businesses and individuals in each credit risk category have an increase in their default 
rates equal to the average default of that credit risk category, and (iii) businesses and individuals in each 
credit risk category have an increase in their default rates equal to two times the average default of that 
credit risk category. The second channel incorporates losses directly on the government loans, by assuming 
that banks may lose 0 percent, 10 percent, or 25 percent of the market value of their government loans for a 
variety of reasons. 
Panel A: All 28 - Government default, 45 percent recovery rate on business and customers' loans.
Losses on 
Government 











































All 28 banks 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,017 0,022 0,030
Bail-Out' Cost:
All 28 banks 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,055 0,057 0,057
99% VaR Level:
All 28 banks 0,143 0,143 0,143 0,110 0,108 0,105 0,027 0,024 0,021
Panel B: All 28 - Government default, 15 percent recovery rate on business and customers' loans.
Losses on 
Government 











































All 28 banks 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,025 0,033 0,036
Bail-Out' Cost:
All 28 banks 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,058 0,059 0,061
99% VaR Level:
All 28 banks 0,142 0,141 0,141 0,106 0,103 0,101 0,022 0,019 0,016
51Table 13 
Simulated Capital Ratios: Individual Aggregate Banks, No Government Default 
This table provides statistics and VaR values at different percentage levels, using 2000 simulated capital 
ratios, for the three hypothetical aggregate banks, by credit rating, for the case when the GOB is assumed 
never to default.  The assumed recovery rate on defaulted private sector loans is 45 percent in these 
simulations.
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Initial 0.081 0.106 0.219
Mean 0.094 0.128 0.227
St. Dev. 0.002 0.004 0.004
Maximum 0.101 0.143 0.241
Minimum 0.082 0.107 0.210
VaR Levels:
1.0% 0.087 0.117 0.216
2.5% 0.089 0.119 0.218
5.0% 0.090 0.120 0.220
10.0% 0.091 0.122 0.221
25.0% 0.093 0.125 0.224
50.0% 0.095 0.128 0.227
75.0% 0.096 0.131 0.229
90.0% 0.097 0.133 0.232
95.0% 0.098 0.135 0.233
97.5% 0.098 0.136 0.235
99.0% 0.099 0.138 0.236
52Table 14 
Simulated Default Probabilities, Average ‘Bail-Out’ Cost, and 99% Capital Ratios: 
Individual Aggregate Banks, Government Default 
This table presents simulated default probabilities on groups of banks, average ‘bail-out’ cost as the average 
capital (as percentage of total assets) necessary to bring banks’ capital ratio back to 0.08 level, whenever 
they fall below 0.03 (assumed default), and the 99% VaR simulated capital ratio is the threshold below 
which banks capital ratio will fall 1 percent of the time. We assume various different scenarios. On the 
business and individuals loans, we assume that: (i) businesses and individuals have a zero increment to their 
default rates; (ii) businesses and individuals in each credit risk category have an increase in their default 
rates equal to the average default of that credit risk category, and (iii) businesses and individuals in each 
credit risk category have an increase in their default rates equal to two times the average default of that 
credit risk category. The second channel incorporates losses directly on the government securities, by 
assuming that banks may lose 0 percent, 10 percent, or 25 percent of the market value of their government 
securities for a variety of reasons.
Panel A: Recovery rate on defaulted private sector loans = 45%.
Losses on 
Government 











































Group 1 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,048 0,048 0,048
Group 2 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,004 0,018
Group 3 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Bail-Out' Cost:
Group 1 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,054 0,055 0,055 0,122 0,123 0,124
Group 2 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,051 0,054 0,057
Group 3 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
99% VaR Level:
Group 1 0,087 0,087 0,086 0,046 0,046 0,045 -0,048 -0,049 -0,049
Group 2 0,132 0,130 0,126 0,109 0,103 0,096 0,045 0,035 0,025
Group 3 0,211 0,211 0,211 0,186 0,184 0,183 0,112 0,110 0,108
Panel B: Recovery rate on defaulted private sector loans = 15%.
Losses on 
Government 











































Group 1 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,048 0,048 0,048
Group 2 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,007 0,017 0,034
Group 3 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Bail-Out' Cost:
Group 1 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,058 0,057 0,057 0,128 0,129 0,130
Group 2 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,057 0,060 0,063
Group 3 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
99% VaR Level:
Group 1 0,081 0,081 0,081 0,040 0,039 0,038 -0,055 -0,056 -0,057
Group 2 0,125 0,123 0,119 0,103 0,095 0,086 0,034 0,024 0,013
Group 3 0,208 0,208 0,207 0,182 0,180 0,178 0,106 0,105 0,103
53Table 15-A 
Systemic Risk: Simultaneously Simulated Aggregate Banks 
Recovery Rate on Defaulted Private Sector Loans = 45 percent 
This table presents simultaneously simulated default probabilities on groups of banks, average ‘bail-out’ 
cost as the average capital (as percentage of total assets) necessary to bring banks’ capital ratio back to 0.08 
level, whenever they fall below 0.03 (assumed default), and the 99% VaR simulated capital ratio is the 
threshold below which banks capital ratio will fall 1 percent of the time.  
Recovery rate = 45%
0












0% 0,000 0,000 0,000
10% 0,000 0,000 0,000
25% 0,016 0,021 0,030
(0,109) (0,110) (0,111)
40% 0,048 0,048 0,048
(0,239) (0,251) (0,258)
50% 0,048 0,048 0,048
(0,358) (0,362) (0,366)
0












0% 0,000 0,000 0,000
10% 0,000 0,000 0,000
25% 0,000 0,000 0,000
40% 0,048 0,048 0,048
(0,168) (0,177) (0,182)
50% 0,048 0,048 0,048
(0,271) (0,275) (0,279)



























Panel A: Probability of Groups 1 and 2 defaulting at the same time and associated cost (given 
default), to bring both banks' capital ratios to 0.08.



























Panel B: Probability of all groups defaulting at the same time and associated cost (given 
default), to bring all banks' capital ratios to 0.08.
54Table 15-B 
Systemic Risk: Simultaneously Simulated Aggregate Banks 
Recovery Rate on Defaulted Private Sector Loans = 15 percent 
This table presents simultaneously simulated default probabilities on groups of banks, average ‘bail-out’ 
cost as the average capital (as percentage of total assets) necessary to bring banks’ capital ratio back to 0.08 
level, whenever they fall below 0.03 (assumed default), and the 99% VaR simulated capital ratio is the 
threshold below which banks capital ratio will fall 1 percent of the time.  
Recovery rate = 15%
0












0% 0,000 0,000 0,000
10% 0,000 0,000 0,000
25% 0,034 0,036 0,039
(0,114) (0,117) (0,119)
40% 0,048 0,048 0,048
(0,259) (0,267) (0,274)
50% 0,048 0,048 0,048
(0,369) (0,373) (0,378)
0












0% 0,000 0,000 0,000
10% 0,000 0,000 0,000
25% 0,000 0,000 0,000
40% 0,048 0,048 0,048
(0,183) (0,189) (0,195)
50% 0,048 0,048 0,048
(0,280) (0,284) (0,289)



























Panel A: Probability of Groups 1 and 2 defaulting at the same time and associated cost (given 
default), to bring both banks' capital ratios to 0.08.



























Panel B: Probability of all groups defaulting at the same time and associated cost (given 
default), to bring all banks' capital ratios to 0.08.
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